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Abstract 
The study of deterrence provides a unique and insightful alternative for the evaluation 
of state revisionism and status-quo adherence. This thesis provides an innovate method 
and proof-of-concept for the categorization of state revisionism, through 
operationalization of state deterrence strategies, using two of the most topical and 
relevant rising powers as cases: the Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China, 
during the so-called period of the ‘Rise of the Rest’ and the ‘Return of Geopolitics’. 
Through the use of data-driven qualitative content analysis, areas of interest are 
determined; from which key events are identified and evaluated by comparing the 
empirical results to the theoretical frameworks of deterrence and the long-established 
definition of revisionism. Through this methodology, this thesis finds that both the 
Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China are revisionist states, with the 
Russian Federation being significantly more revisionist than China; due to the differing 
security environments, historical and territorial context, and deterrence conceptions. By 
using the study of deterrence as an explanatory framework, this thesis provides a proof-
of-concept and model for future research, and is the first holistic study on state 
revisionism in over 15 years, as well as it is the first comparative measurement-based 
study of its class. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There has been much concern recently in both academic circles and among world actors 
about the so-called ‘Rise of the Rest’ and the ‘Return of Geopolitics’, such that Western 
hegemony over wealth, power, and values are being challenged by revisionist powers 
seeking to undermine and even replace the current international system. The Russian 
resurgence of assertion: intervention into Ukraine and associated annexation of Crimea, 
aggressive nuclear rhetoric, energy politics, military modernization, cyber-attacks, and 
disinformation campaigns, to name a few; has alarmed many in the West on the 
displacement of the current status-quo. Further to the East, the Chinese assertion over 
disputed territory in the South China Sea has drawn substantial concern as well, due to 
the increasing Chinese military presence and activities in a region that represents 
roughly one-third of global shipping.  Moreover, the advent and presence of the Dong 
Feng ‘carrier-killer’ intermediate-range ballistic missiles [IRBM] presents a clear 
challenge to the American power-projection and ally assurance in the area.  
 
While observers seem to agree that Western hegemony is being challenged, they do not 
agree on the very nature of this challenge, with some expecting and predicting major 
upheaval [revisionism], some expecting reform or even defining the actions of 
Russia/China as maintaining the norm [status-quo]. Moreover, there is a clear 
discrepancy in the literature concerning the degree of attribution to which the labels 
‘status-quo’ and ‘revisionist’ are applied to both China and Russia; even to the extent of 
attributing these labels a priori, without methodological justification. Russian strategy 
and actions have been described as revisionist, seeking to challenge the international 
system; however they also have been described as status-quo: attempting to preserve the 
buffer zone against NATO by preventing adjacent states from leaving its sphere of 
influence and/or joining the EU/NATO. China’s actions have been described as 
revisionist, seeking to challenge US hegemony; however it has also been described as 
status-quo, seeking to assert itself over its interests as a regional power, without 
aspirations to challenge the international system. Several of these studies go so far as to 
claim that Russia and China are status-quo powers, and the West precipitated revisionist 
behaviors that forced Russian and Chinese action to maintain the status-quo. Currently 
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the corpus of literature concerning the status-quo and/or revisionist nature of the 
Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China primarily frame the debate on 
revisionism as both dichotomous where Russia/China is a revisionist/status-quo power 
and the West/ United States is the opposite. There are some studies that attempt to 
measure whether either Russia or China is a status-quo or revisionist power explicitly, 
however the holistic studies are fairly outdated (15+ years) and the contemporary 
studies are primarily concerned with specific actions in specific, singular policy 
dimensions, rather than overall strategy or posture.  Moreover this dichotomous nature 
of the states involved, are primarily categorized along a binary nature, either being 
revisionist or status-quo, with no differentiation or delineation along a gradient between 
the two to measure to what extent each state falls under each categorization. 
 
The classification and understanding of the extent of a state as a status-quo or a 
revisionist power is of significant consequence, as the substantive difference in threat 
perceptions and identification, as well as subsequent, associated actions relating to 
them, across the entire spectrum of political actors; has stark political consequences. 
Moreover, the extent to which a state is revisionist or status-quo, as well as the primary 
motivations encouraging a state to adopt such stances, have drastic implications on the 
structural nature of state relations along several dimensions. Therefore, it is of 
paramount importance that the classification of the extent to which the Russian 
Federation and People’s Republic of China as status-quo or revisionist is accurately 
answered.  
 
The objective of this thesis is to address this gap in the existing literature and provide a 
comprehensive analytical model that compares and contrasts Chinese and Russian 
native deterrence conceptions and applications of deterrence, during key events in 
specified areas of interest to determine to what extent they can be categorized as 
revisionist or status-quo powers. The usage of the analysis of deterrence posture offers 
an insightful option in determining status-quo and revisionist attributes of a state, as 
deterrence posture is a multi-sectoral state function that encompasses the overall 
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strategic viewpoint and self-placement of the state, as it is an all-encompassing 
endeavor that is directly linked to a state’s survival. 
 
This will be done within the framework of a comparative study, as these cases have 
been ascribed similar characteristics with the same point of departure [Both states being 
described as either status-quo or revisionist], analyzing the convergence and divergence 
in the deterrence approaches of each state, to determine the underlying factor(s) that 
contribute to their similarities and differences. The Russian Federation and People’s 
Republic of China have been chosen as cases for their topicality, distinct international 
relevance, and particular gap in analysis concerning methodological ascription of status-
quo and revisionism. The indicators will be drawn from the supplementary method of 
Data-Driven Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA), primarily focused on the 
governmental national defense documents, doctrine, and press releases; or secondary 
source translation or analysis in the case where primary documents are scarce, that 
define native deterrence outlooks and areas of interest. This is done for the purpose of 
applying native conceptions of deterrence, rather than overlaying Western 
preconceptions and projections, which would run the risk of obfuscating or 
misinterpreting the native conceptions, reasoning, and application. The timeline will 
primarily be taken post-2014, after the so-called ‘Rise of Geopolitics’, an oft-quoted 
[directly or indirectly] point of departure in the relevant, associated academic literature; 
where a resurgence of revisionist behavior and ideology is widely acknowledged to 
make its way back to the world stage. Naturally, the roots of this resurgence predate 
2014, which will be acknowledged as supplementary material, however the predominant 
focus will be on events post-2014. 
 
Four research questions, two primary and two derivative, drive the methodological 
structure and empirical analysis: firstly, ‘What are the differences between the 
deterrence strategies of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation?’ 
[1]; and secondly, ‘Can China and Russia ultimately be categorized as revisionist 
powers through their deterrence strategies [2]?’ The derivative questions are respective 
to their counterparts: firstly, ‘Why might there be diverging drivers for deterrence 
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conceptions/outcomes between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of 
China?’ [1B]; and secondly, ‘If China and Russia can be categorized as revisionist 
powers, to what extent [2B]?’ Analysis of the deterrence conceptions and applications 
provides a potential valuable vector to address the afore-mentioned theoretical gap in 
the background literature concerning the status-quo and revisionist categorization of 
these two states; by providing a holistic approach, encompassing many policy 
dimensions along both a geographic and a strategic-level perspective. 
 
From the theoretical framework and background approach, the initial expectation is that 
China will have a softer-bounded approach, regardless of the degree of status-quo or 
revisionism expressed, due to their Minimum/Limited Deterrence conception. On the 
other hand, comparatively, the Russian approach will appear to be more emphatically 
aggressive as a result due to their Strategic Deterrence conception. 
 
The thesis is structured in four main sections. The first provides an overview of the 
background literature, theoretical gap, and research solution. The second provides the 
theoretical framework, specific deterrence formulations, and conceptual relationships 
that form the ideational foundation the thesis. The methodological breakdown is 
supplied in the third section, detailing the research design, research methods, case 
selection justifications, research paradigm delineation, as well as the coding and 
indicators through which the empirical data is gathered and categorized. In the fourth 
section, the afore-mentioned empirical findings are correlated, categorized, and 
analyzed. Lastly, the conclusion encapsulates and contextualizes these findings and their 
implications in relation to the academic literature and practical environments. 
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CHAPTER I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section contains the literature review: a comprehensive analysis on the state of the 
art concerning the ascription and categorization of the People’s Republic of China and 
Russian Federation as either status-quo or revisionist states. The background literature 
contains a gap, as much of the categorization of the two states is done a priori, without 
methodological justification. The studies that do contain methodological evaluation, 
primarily have used single-sectoral/domain analysis to determine status-quo or 
revisionist attributes of the two states. Single-sector analysis has a limited explanatory 
ability due to its narrow scope. This paper argues that the study of deterrence, as a 
multi-sectoral approach, would greatly improve the explanatory ability to determine 
whether a state is status-quo or revisionist due to its holistic, strategic, and integral 
nature concerning the state. 
 
1.1 China 
The chronological scope of this corpus of academic literature on Chinese revisionism 
and the status-quo primarily encompasses studies from the mid-2000s to the present 
[early 2019 at the time of the writing of this thesis]; however there are outliers as old as 
the 1995 (Johnston, 1995) concerning the Chinese conceptions of Limited Deterrence. 
That being said, the primary study from which most subsequent studies on the topic of 
Chinese revisionism exist referential to, is a 2003 study by Johnston. This study 
establishes the explicit definition of revisionism used by many studies henceforth, even 
those not concerning China: “... a revisionist state is one which does not participate 
actively in major international institutions, which breaks the rules and norms of those 
international institutions in which it does participate, or which temporarily abides by 
the rules and norms but when presented with the opportunity tries to alter them in ways 
inconsistent with the original purposes of the institution and community…”. Therefore, 
given the straightforward and easily transferable nature of this definition in terms of 
application to other states, this is the definition of revisionism that will be used in 
reference to this study.  
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Worries about China’s rise as an aspiring global power have existed since before the 
turn of the millennium. Shambaugh (2001) acknowledges this in a study, which pits 
China against the United States in a binary classification within a binary outcome 
frame; where only one state may hold either categorization state, whilst the other must 
exist as the directly opposing categorization state. This study insinuates that, regardless 
of orientation, one must exist in opposition of the other, as the two cannot coexist as 
such. This oppositional logic is seen in many of the following studies. 
 
Huiyun (2009) attempted to determine the level of status-quo and revisionist attitudes 
that Chinese leadership held from the inception of the People’s Republic of China. The 
author uses historical case studies to determine Chinese leaders’ beliefs using 
operational code analysis. The results of the study show that there is a declining trend in 
revisionism chronologically, to the ultimate end of the author claiming that only Mao 
Zedong was revisionist due to the historical context.  
 
Walter (2010) attempts to determine Chinese status-quo or revisionist attitudes on the 
basis of adherence and adoption of global financial regulatory norms. In this study, 
several problems on the issue of measurement emerge. Attribution of the intent behind 
government actions to either reject or adopt measures, as well as to the speed in which 
the norms are adopted may have many influencing factors; bureaucracy, existing norms, 
pragmatism, etc. Additionally there is a bifurcated and incomplete adoption of these 
norms and standards by the biggest guarantors of the norms and standards, e.g. the 
United States; which poses the issue of to what extent can adoption of norms be 
indicative of status-quo or revisionist attitudes. A study by Combes (2011) ran into 
similar issues concerning adherence to the international norms of global trade, non-
proliferation, and environmental regimes. Combes also ascribed status-quo/revisionist 
attributes to other international actors a priori, without measurement. Taylor (2007), 
likewise attempted to analyzed adherence to international norms, organization, and laws 
to which it is party; and ran into similar issues of methodology and measurement. 
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Mearsheimer (2006) takes this issue of methodological impreciseness further in his 
article ‘China’s Unpeaceful Rise’. He ascribes much onto China from his own opinion 
without methodological justification or rigorous support to his many arguments. He 
projects much from Western ideals, trends, and precedent. 
 
Kastner and Saunders (2012) base their argumentation on whether China is a status-quo 
or revisionist state on the supposition that leadership travels are an indicator of foreign 
policy priorities. The authors present one of the few discerning studies that attempts to 
measure status-quo and revisionist attitudes using mutually-exclusive methodological 
rigor. However, the theoretical goalposts are difficult to pin down as it is unclear at what 
measurement of frequency of travel, specific capacity, and material outcome constitutes 
revisionism. While, leadership travel may be an indicator of foreign policy priorities; to 
make the argument of a state’s attributional status, solely on the basis of leadership 
travel, would be difficult. 
 
1.2. Russia 
The chronological scope of the corpus of academic literature concerning the status-quo 
and revisionist qualities of the Russian Federation primarily consists of studies and 
journal articles post-2014 and shortly thereafter with an outlier concerning the general 
trends that would eventually lead to the Russian intervention into Ukraine and this so-
called ‘return to geopolitics’ and ‘rise of revisionism’ (Larabee, 2010). Explanatory 
context is needed as to why the academic literature regarding such revisionist tendencies 
occur so far from the natural hard limit of the fall of the Soviet Union. At the time of the 
fall of the Soviet Union, it was characterized that Russia ceased to be a threat, and was 
‘defeated’, instead focusing on recovering, reorganizing, and reintegrating into the 
world economic system and international community. Thusly, more attention was 
placed onto the United States of America as the sole remaining superpower and de-facto 
global hegemonic power and the global order that was to follow; specifically, on how 
the US would preserve paradigm surrounding the unipolar transition and subsequent 
apotheosis (Mastanduno, 1997). The decade following the fall of the Soviet Union was 
marked by hope and anticipation of further Russian ‘buy-in’ to the international system 
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and liberal democratic norm adoption; up to and including EU membership. However 
concurrent and subsequent to this period of time, there was a measured anxiety in the 
West, as those accession and integration talks failed. Russia instead worked on 
developing its own sphere of influence and alternative regional organizations such as 
the Collective Security Treaty Organization [CSTO] and what came to be known as the 
Eurasian Economic Union [EEU] set up in seeming opposition as a mutually-exclusive 
option to North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] and the European Union [EU] 
respectively; who were accepting former Soviet states as members (Larrabee, 2010). 
While the organizations and their non-Soviet, post-fall predecessors were established 
relatively early, the organizations themselves were not so diametrically opposed to their 
Western counterparts at that time.  
 
This paradigm of minor concerned escalated into growing anxiety over the 2008 
intervention into Georgia, yet the outcome was somewhat tolerated in the West, and was 
not seen as the paradigm changer as the 2014 Intervention into Ukraine. It was at this 
latter point that the discourse on Russian revisionism spiked dramatically (Larrabee, 
2010). 
 
Mearsheimer (2014a) discounts this “prevailing wisdom”, and details a geopolitical 
status-quo of spheres of influence, and then describes how the West had been slowly 
expanding and absorbing former USSR satellite states; and the ‘illegal coup’ in Ukraine 
was the final straw for Russia. Mearsheimer details the ‘warning shot’ with the 2008 
Russo-Georgian war. He indirectly ascribes status-quo attributes to Russia and 
revisionist attributes to the West. 
 
In a second piece, an op-ed for the New York Times, Mearsheimer (2014b) elaborates 
this viewpoint, attributing great power status to the United States and Russia. He claims 
that the United States is not looking at the Ukrainian situation in geopolitical terms, as 
Putin is, but in different legal terms that absolve the West as a whole, of all wrongdoing 
in terms of creating the situation.  
14 
 
 
McFaul (2014) writes a retort to Mearsheimer (2014a) in Foreign Affairs, indirectly 
assigning the revisionist attribute to Russia in lieu of Mearsheimer’s status-quo 
attribution. He uses empirical action and reaction paradigms in the ‘reset’ years between 
Obama and Putin to illustrate his point. McFaul rests the blame on unrest originating 
from internal dynamics in regards to another round of enduring electoral fraud coupled 
with Putin’s announcement of returning for a third term; and subsequent Russian 
deflection upon a convenient and outside source. 
 
Sestanovich, in the same publication (2014), also critiques Mearsheimer’s article’s 
internal logic (2014a), citing Ukraine’s internal strife, Moscow’s interference and 
influence, the ‘Ukraine Question’ in NATO policymaking, as well as extensive literary 
support from Mearsheimer’s own previous article on the subject (Mearsheimer, 1993). 
Sestanovich then blames Putin’s public support for aggressive and violent repression of 
the protesters for the fall of Yanukovych’s regime; and attributes the subsequent 
humiliation causally to the seizure of Crimea and following intervention into Ukraine.  
 
Mearsheimer (2014c) in the same publication, writes his rebuttal to both McFaul and 
Sestanovich, attacking their credibility and accusing them of misrepresenting his 
argument. He challenges the assertion that Sestanovich presented in the ‘virtual’ 
disappearance of NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine disappearing after 2008, 
stating that “No Western leader publically questioned the alliance’s 2008 declaration 
that Georgia and Ukraine ‘will become members of NATO’”, adding that the United 
States was one of said members backing that “pet project”. He acknowledges that 
McFaul and Sestanovich may truly have thought that the NATO extension to Ukraine 
was off the table, but he asserts that “no prudent Russian leader” would interpret it in 
that manner. Mearsheimer then characterizes the 2014 coup as illegitimate, due to its 
violent nature.  
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Konyshev and Sergunin (2014) focus on the Arctic dimension of Russian foreign policy 
as a measure of status-quo and revisionism of the Russian state. The Arctic, he argues, 
is a region where the Russian Federation is not seeking an expansionist, aggressive 
policy; instead it seeks to preserve the status-quo. His analysis of the Russian 
militarization concluded that the modernization programs did not add significant 
offensive capabilities. Instead, Konyshev and Sergunin denote this military 
modernization as demonstration of Russia’s great power status.  
 
Haukkala (2015) studies the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis by analyzing the foreign relations 
between the European Union and the Russian Federation, during the formation of the 
new status-quo following the collapse of the USSR. This study raises interesting 
questions on the aspects of revisionism/status-quo while the status-quo is forming. 
 
1.3. Comparison of Cases 
The more recent articles from this corpus of this background literature concerning the 
status-quo and revisionist aspects of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian 
Federation primarily has a sectoral focus to either directly or indirectly determine the 
adherence to status-quo or to determine a revisionist nature. Articles concerning the 
People’s Republic of China vary from what sector is analyzed and expounded upon as 
indicative of the status-quo or revisionist orientation; whereas articles regarding the 
Russian Federation almost entirely measure the status-quo and/or revisionist aspects 
through focus on the military aspects and actions conducted; as the vehicle through 
which these arguments are made [the exception being the article by Haukkala (2015)]. 
The vast majority of the Russian analytic substance primarily focuses on the study of 
military orientation and actions. The framing of the global placement of the People’s 
Republic of China varies, from aspiring regional and global power, to not being 
mentioned at all. The framing of the global placement of the Russian Federation 
generally is concerned with the rise, resurgence, and return of the great power politics, 
whether continuance of the status-quo as an enduring or ‘temporarily-embarrassed’ 
great power; or conversely, as a revisionist power, attempting to seize or prove its own 
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‘great powerism’ to the world. Within either paradigm, the predominant focus of the 
vast majority of the articles in the corpus is on the Russian intervention into Ukraine. 
 
It is important to note that when the two states are mentioned together, China and 
Russia are seen as within the same binary categorization, regardless of if the 
categorization is revisionist or status-quo, and the United States/European Union/West 
is paired against them as the opposing binary categorization as the other (Mead, 2014; 
Zakaria, 2013). In most cases the ‘other’ is considered to be either the United States 
explicitly, the nebulous ‘West’, generally considered to contain the European Union and 
NATO; or even more nebulous ‘international order’, which generally encompasses the 
previous ‘others’ with the added norms, international organizations, and treatises 
therein. This also holds true in all articles in this corpus that have a categorization to 
where the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation are mentioned 
explicitly to be either status-quo or revisionist; or to have characteristics of either 
attributional status; the United States of America remains the ‘other’ in every 
categorization, even if that same other is status-quo to a more mixed categorization of 
China; the delineation and ‘otherness’ of the United States remains intact. In no cases in 
this corpus, have we seen either the Russian Federation and the United States, or the 
People’s Republic of China and the United States in the same categorization; the only 
characterization that approaches this categorization is an addendum that states that even 
though the United States [and West in general] may be considered [a] status-quo 
power[s], in that particular case, they do not always adhere to the rules and norms they 
agree to in international organizations (Walter, 2010).  
 
Additionally, the framing of revisionism and status-quo, especially with Russia, is 
portrayed not in a spectrum, but as a binary categorization within these texts above; 
which is problematic, as much nuance is lost with that lack of specification. On the 
other hand, the background literature concerning the argumentation for the attributional 
status of the People’s Republic of China primarily does have characterizations where 
both status-quo and revisionist qualities are ascribed to the state during analysis; though, 
regardless of ultimate attribution, there is a marked difficulty in clearly delineating the 
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nature of the state as status-quo or revisionist (Walter, 2010; Combes, 2011; Taylor 
2007). However, these ascriptions have not resulted in the creation of secondary 
classifications. 
 
The factors and indicators in contemporary studies, if used, are generally limited to 
specific policy dimensions in specific geographical locations, which is not sufficiently 
indicative of the overall stance of the state. Furthermore, there is little in the 
contemporary literature of measuring Chinese military actions; and Russian 
revisionism/status-quo estimation is generally used as a state-of-being argument, not 
actually measured explicitly. The little measurement contained and included in these 
studies are derived from sectoral analysis, which ultimately is limited in its explanatory 
ability for holistic strategic analysis, with a binary classification matrix (Larrabee, 2010; 
McFaul, 2014; Mearsheimer, 2014a; Mearsheimer, 2014; Mearsheimer 2014c, Mead, 
2014; Sestanovich, 2014; Zakaria, 2013). The closest measurement on the degree of 
holistic state revisionism has been sector-based or issue-based adherence to 
international regimes (Johnston, 2003), with the studies own authors denoting their 
difficulty in ascribing intent as to revisionist or pragmatist behavior, in light of the 
assertion that many status-quo powers seek to ignore many of the same binding regimes 
and applied norms as well (Walter, 2010; Combes, 2011; Taylor 2007). 
 
1.4. Research Solution 
The analysis of overall deterrence posture and associated military actions offer a 
hitherto unexplored dimension of determining status-quo adherence and addressing 
these gaps in the academic literature. Deterrence posture is a multi-sectoral state 
function that provides insight into the overall strategic viewpoint and self-placement of 
that state, as it is an all-encompassing endeavor that is directly linked to a state’s 
survival.  
 
While previous studies in this literary corpus have attempted to link a series of military 
actions in a theatre to a claim of revisionism vs status-quo adherence (Johnston, 2003; 
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Taylor 2007; Shambaugh, 2003), there has been little contemporary literature examining 
the holistic nature of state documents concerning deterrence, actions, and events in 
multiple locales in Chinese and Russian foreign policy.  Isolated analyses of regional 
actions such as the level of Russian militarization of the Arctic (Konyshev & Sergunin), 
intervention into Ukraine and Georgia (Mearsheimer 2014a; Mead, 2014); as well as the 
Chinese militarization of disputed regions in the South China Sea (Mead,2014; Huiyun, 
2009) certainly provide valuable insight into the doctrine and regional strategic aim of 
these states; however determining the overall nature of the regimes, as revisionist or 
status-quo, requires a study with a wider lens. These regional and topical studies, while 
valuable in their own right, only offer an incomplete picture when it comes to the 
holistic strategic aim of these states. Focusing the lens onto overall deterrence posture, 
brings into focus the strategic disposition of these states as seen through their eyes, as it 
is through native interpretations of deterrence, instead of an overlaid projection from the 
Western-dominated academic literature that would otherwise distort the interpretation of 
the findings.  
 
This study focuses on these important gaps in explanation and degree in which 
adherence to revisionism or the status-quo is expressed, and seeks to offer a better 
conceptualization and measurement of status-quo/revisionism in international politics. It 
does so by devising an innovative way to identify and classify the degree to which 
status-quo/revisionism is expressed by a state by measuring key events in defined areas 
of interest vis-a-vis the native conceptions of deterrence that define the bounds and 
objectives under which a state operates. 
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CHAPTER II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
This section introduces the theoretical foundation of the thesis. Three schools of 
deterrence will be explored: Western, Chinese, and Russian. Western Deterrence will be 
used as a comparative to the native deterrence conceptions. There will be a focus on 
inter-state deterrence to determine revisionism/status-quo attributions; as a focus on 
non-state actors in most cases, does not necessarily provide mutually-exclusive 
delineation on status-quo/revisionist adherence. Reference to stratagems regarding non-
state actors would be used as supplementary material if it appears in the analytic corpus. 
Furthermore, terminology that will be operationalized within the methodological section 
will be introduced and defined in this section. 
 
This thesis will primarily be constructed via the theoretical perspective of deterrence 
theory. As established in the previous chapters of this thesis, the selection of overall 
deterrence posture as the vehicle through which the level of status-quo or revisionist 
status is evaluated, was conducted on the merit of the holistic and multi-sectoral nature 
of deterrence posture as the strategic disposition of the state. 
 
2.1. Western Deterrence Theory 
For the conceptualization of Western deterrence theory, this paper will primarily use the 
Psychological Deterrence and Rational Deterrence conceptions, used by Schelling and 
Huth respectively; along with further references by Jentleson, whose terminology is 
used in many NATO official security documents on deterrence. These conceptions of 
Western Deterrence theory are further expanded on practically by Betts, Jervis, Knopf, 
F. Morgan, P. Morgan, and Whytock. Western deterrence theory is often used as a 
comparative, especially with Russian deterrence theory; therefore the inclusion of it 
inside of the theoretical framework for this paper is crucial as a comparative control to 
provide the ‘othered’ anchor to which the native deterrence conceptions can be 
contrasted. This section will not be overly extensive, as it represents the baseline control 
to which the native deterrence conceptions will be measured. In cases of necessary 
specificity, the requisite comparatives will be located in the native deterrence 
conception sections. 
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The general precepts of Western deterrence theory are Jentleson’s conceptions of 
proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive credibility; which are used extensively in 
several generations of Western deterrence literature, as well as in the national security 
strategies of many NATO states (Haggard, 2019). Proportionality refers to the 
proportional relationship between ends and means (Jentleson & Whytock, 2006). 
Reciprocity refers to the linkage and trust paradigm between defending incentives and 
attacking concessions (P.Morgan, 2005). Coercive credibility refers to the reputational 
believability that a given state will follow-through on its threats (P.Morgan, 2003). 
 
2.1.1. Psychological Deterrence Theory 
Psychological Deterrence is the now-classic theory on the expansion of military strategy 
to include psychological variables in addition to traditional military conceptions. In the 
Psychological Deterrence model, the interrelationship between the capacity of a state to 
conduct warfare, levels of threat employed to coerce behavior or to intimidate other 
states, as well as the subsequent and concurrent posturing of allied, neutral, target, and 
hostile states create a system of bargaining power as a measure of political capital; 
variable upon capacity, usage, relative capability, and current social and environmental 
dynamics (Schelling, 1966). Psychological Deterrence evolved into an inductive model, 
rather than a deductive model; as it focuses on past behavior in historical cases, rather 
than an innate assumption of standardized and homogenous rationality; within a 
political psychology framework rather than from a pure realist frame. The focus from 
the deterrence model is primarily concerned with how the specific deterrence actions 
and overall strategy affect the target actor and influences the target’s psychological 
aspect vis-a-vis leadership (Jervis, Lebow & Stein, 1989). Thusly, Psychological 
Deterrence is a model that prioritizes the collation, categorization, and analysis of the 
different perceptions that exist in a particular paradigmal ecosystem. Naturally these 
perceptions may diverge from ‘objective’ reality, which may be due to circumstance or 
intentional derived action. Regardless, these information differences ultimately affect 
decision-making, and the misinformation or disinformation that is acted upon has great 
ramifications for the objective situation in reality. These misperceptions may be in the 
vein of credibility of any actor within the ecosystem, value of the object being acted 
upon, the available alternative options for an adversary, etc. These perceptions may also 
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lead to self-deterrence, as the British government leading up to World War II; or 
conversely, overconfidence (Jervis, 1982). Psychological Deterrence frames its model 
upon assumptions of risk aversion, the prioritization of [state] survival, such that a cost-
benefit analogue is taken into consideration with psychological factors (Jervis, 1979); as 
well as loss-aversion, the innate disinclination and dispreference for ‘losing’ or having 
the perception of having lost. Loss-aversion is a psychological aspect that affects both 
the populace of a state, as well as the political elite and leadership (Jervis, 1992); as the 
perception of ‘losing’ affects everything from legitimacy, to approval rating, re-election 
chances, as well as their personal psyche [in the relevant case of leadership].  
 
 
2.1.2. Rational Deterrence Theory 
Rational Deterrence Theory (Huth, Gelpi & Bennett, 1993) is a conception with a game 
theory base of rational actors conducting mutual evaluation on such factors as the 
military-political balance, reputational qualities concerning past behavior (Huth,1997), 
signaling credibility [costliness], and known interests (Huth, 1999). In this regard, all 
actors in this paradigm are assumed to be rational, with an offensive equational cost-
benefit matrix that denotes potential gains to unacceptable damage, tangent to the 
credibility of both their own threat, as well as the projected defense and retaliation (P. 
Morgan 2003). Signaling credibility as a function of costliness describes the notion that 
all states are incentivized to signal their political and military behavior in such a way 
that would prioritize survival and the maximize the accomplishment of their goals; 
knowing this, the state would thusly be required to prove the validity of their signalling 
action by incurring costs that otherwise would not be acceptable for a lesser action, such 
as a mobilization or relocation of military personnel or strategic weaponry. The ‘known 
interest’ factor is a measure of the level of involvement a state has with a particular 
region, state, or specific sectoral paradigm; and is collated and correlated against the 
other factors as a variable on predicted involvement. Rational Deterrence theory 
presupposes the self-interested pragmatism of the titular rationality for all actors, as well 
as the homogenous aspect of nations that does not take into account the difference in 
subjective threat perception assessment (F. Morgan, 2010). It also does not take into 
account simple diplomatic miscommunication or strategic miscalculation (Betts, 2013); 
22 
 
nor adequately takes into account, the innate predictive uncertainty that exists within the 
ecosystem of international relations that drastically affects policy-making (Betts, 1985) 
vis-a-vis incomplete information, misinformation, disinformation, and misinterpretation 
available to and received by policymakers (Jervis, 1989), resulting in a “probable costs” 
to “probable benefits” matrix (F. Morgan, 2010), that later studies have addressed. The 
theory focuses on the preventative aspect of deterring action; whether direct military 
action, military action onto and into another area [Extended Deterrence], or generally, 
dissuading a given political action. The litmus test of success for Rational Deterrence 
theory is fundamentally determined by whether or not the deterrence succeeds or not in 
deterring the action. 
 
2.1.3. State of the Art: Western Deterrence Conceptions 
“Overall, the most important result of the fourth wave has been to reveal the value of 
moving toward a broader concept of deterrence that incorporates non-nuclear and even 
non-military sources of leverage”. (Knopf, 2010) 
 
The so-called ‘fourth wave’ of deterrence research was marked by an ideational 
expansion to accommodate the new challenges presented by the Global War on Terror 
and the paradigm shift from a bipolar competition between the United States and Soviet 
Union to a unipolar global order (Knopf, 2010). Previously, the ideational and 
theoretical gaps that deterrence research was able to address, became wider; and 
deterrence study was seen as a ‘second-best’ option for state security needs outside of 
bespoke or tailored strategies, situations, and interactions (Knopf, 2008a). This 
paradigm shift was followed by an expansion of the bounds of the conception of 
deterrence to adequately address the unique challenges presented by non-state actors 
and asymmetric threats to global security dynamics, insofar much as the differences 
between deterrable state and non-state actors operating in different capacities and 
paradigms (P. Morgan, 2010). Over time, this expansion of the deterrence conception in 
this manner, to address non-state actors, also evolved to encompass state actions that 
may involve non-state actors, asymmetric or unconventional warfare, and previously 
non-weaponized state functions. This also was followed by a decrease in the reliance on 
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traditional deterrence measures, such as nuclear deterrence; as well as a reimagining of 
the nature of extended deterrence (P. Morgan, 2012). Deterrence as a definition, 
expanded to involve ‘anything that can be used to deter’, with non-military means being 
used as a supplementary aspect for nuclear and conventional military means (Knopf, 
2008a). The growing complexity of state usage of non-state functions in support of 
traditional methods of deterrence, as well as asymmetric functions and non-state actors; 
led to a further emphasis on ‘tailored deterrence’, as the uniqueness of a given 
deterrence dilemma presented challenges that a generalized strategy would fail to 
address. Naturally, the formative nature of this deterrence conception led to ‘growing 
pains’, as heuristics regarding projections onto other state actors led to an unfortunate 
misdiagnosis and miscommunication as to the ability to actively tailor the deterrence to 
the target (Knopf, 2008b). This particular aspect has been explored and deemed relevant 
to the Russian case, as we have seen in the background literature, as this now-expanded 
conception broadens the scope and dimensions for deterrence among state actors, 
through the focus on asymmetric threats; of which state actors have the ability to fund, 
facilitate, and encourage. Compounding the complexities of deterrence regarding the 
expanded scope and dimensions for deterrence is the issue of attribution; whereas 
previously attribution was easier to denote, certain aspects of ascribing intentionality 
and responsibility for state actions have become more difficult (P. Morgan, 2012). The 
differentiation in the conception and perception between deterrence conceptions of this 
aspect of state funding and state-management of previously non-weaponized state 
functions as well as asymmetric operations will likely become a focal point in the 
analysis.  
 
2.2. Russian Deterrence Theory 
For the conceptualization of Russian deterrence theory, this study will primarily use the 
conception of ‘strategic deterrence’, and associated subtypes of sderzhivanie 
[restraining], ustrashenie [intimidation], prinuzhdenie [compellence] from the Russian 
national security documents (2010 Military Doctrine, 2014 Military Doctrine, 2015 
National Security Strategy). These concepts are used and elaborated upon by Ven 
Bruusgaard, Adamsky, Sinovets, Renz, and Lanoszka.  
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2.2.1. Russian Strategic Deterrence  
Russian Strategic Deterrence [strategicheskoe sderzhivanie] is a native Russian 
deterrence conception that encompasses the cross-domain concept of what is known in 
the West as the Russian doctrine of ‘hybrid warfare’ and the Russian concept of ‘New 
Generation Warfare’ [NGW]. The conception of Russian Strategic Deterrence as 
‘hybrid warfare’ is a misnomer as well as a primarily Western construct, as the 
categorization of ‘Strategic Deterrence’ is not primarily a military conception with 
aspects of other domains; it is a continuous all-spectrum toolbox 
[Kompleksnyi/sistemnyi podhod] that is to be used both in peacetime, wartime, and 
anywhere in between to accomplish the strategic objectives of the Russian Federation 
(Ven Bruusgaard, 2016). Ironically, Russian experts view New Generation Warfare as a 
response to Western ‘hybrid campaigns’ against Russia; whereas they view their NGW 
[vis-a-vis Strategic Deterrence] as cross-domain deterrence (Adamsky, 2018). Russian 
Strategic Deterrence is generally constructed much more broadly than the Western 
conception of deterrence, containing offensive, defensive, military, non-military, 
nuclear, and non-nuclear tools; used in both peacetime and wartime (Ven Bruusgaard, 
2016). Adamsky argues that, while the current conception of deterrence is, innovative; it 
retains much tradition and historical continuity in respects to Russian strategic culture, 
especially in regards to its strong linguistic and idiosyncratic imprints. Idiosyncratic 
imprints such as the terms of ‘military cunningness’, and other precepts to what is now 
known as  military ‘asymmetry’ or ‘asymmetric’ warfare, had been seen in doctrine 
from the Soviet and even the Tsarist times. The substitution of methods other than force 
was seen as a way to complement and even a multiplicative quality for a commander. 
These linguistic imprints extend to the origins for conflictual terms: ‘struggle’, as well 
as the linguistic origins for ‘deterrence’, add to historical context. Bor’ba, or ‘struggle’ 
is used to describe the terminology used within this deterrence literature, which blurs 
the line between war and peace as a continuous spectrum of enduring struggle. 
Information struggle, radio-electronic struggle, economic struggle, armed struggle; are 
all used in lieu of ‘warfare’ and is phrased in both passive and active components in 
terms of competition (Adamsky, 2018). The Russian words for compellence are 
twofold: Sderzhivanie [Restraining], Ustrashenie [Intimidation]. Sderzhivanie, as 
‘restraining’, ‘keeping out’, or ‘holding back’ is a broader term than the Western 
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deterrence conception, as it encompasses all tools and methods that are used [instead of 
‘could be used’] to prevent war from breaking out; which includes an overarching view 
of an ideation similar to the Western conception of ‘containment’ (Ven Bruusgaard, 
2016). It also has status-quo connotations, as a reactive measure to deter a change in the 
current paradigm (Adamsky, 2018). Ustrashenie, on the other hand, is generally more 
specifically linked to the nuclear arsenal. Usually this term is used in reference to the 
[implicitly illegitimate] deterrent policy of other states and has a few negative 
connotations, associated with ‘nuclear blackmail’. A common reflexive phrase to 
describe Cold War policies conducted by the United States was, according to Ven 
Bruusgaard was ‘sderzhivanie putem ustrasheniya’, or ‘deterrence through 
intimidation’. When reflexively referring to their own deterrence conceptions, Russia 
primarily uses sderzhivanie (Ven Bruusgaard, 2016). A third term: priuzhdenie, or 
‘compellence’, primarily refers to a proactive connotative understanding of actions 
taken to change the status-quo. This term is primarily used to indicate a specific 
delineation on type of influence or action the state is taking. This term is used rather 
awkwardly, as there is not an established term for coercion vis-a-vis a combination of 
deterrence and compellence. Additionally, Adamsky notes that current Russian 
typology lacks adequate specificity for the differentiation of concepts, where the various 
terminology of deterrence were used interchangeably, compounding confusion; as well 
as the double use of ‘Strategic Deterrence’ as referring specifically to the strategic 
nuclear arsenal (Adamsky, 2018). 
 
The Russian Federation’s usage of Strategic Deterrence is a function of its inability to 
compete with regional adversaries such as NATO in every domain. Russian Strategic 
Deterrence attempts to overcome this strategic shortcoming by using this holistic and 
continuous containment, deterrence, and coercion concept to conduct coordinated, 
simultaneous activities to actively and passively influence its adversaries in a cross-
domain manner to use all available tools to deter and dominate conflict (Ven 
Bruusgaard, 2016). Keeping this in mind, the strategic and non-strategic nuclear arsenal 
is still the cornerstone and guarantor of Russian deterrence (Sinovets & Renz, 2015). 
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The objective of the Russian deterrence stratagem is the prevention of behavior through 
management and stabilization within the domains in which it chooses and in which it is 
obliged to ‘struggle’. It aims to deter through and dominate these domains. The primary 
subjective litmus test through which Russian Strategic Deterrence frames its 
effectiveness is the imposition of ‘unacceptable losses’. This framing exists across the 
afore-mentioned multiple constitutive domains, as there is an emphasis on the 
interchangeability of conventional weapons, non-strategic nuclear weapons; and then 
again separately on the use of non-military domains and conventional military domains 
(Ven Bruusgaard, 2016). The logic here is that a traditional strategic nuclear weapon is 
aimed at inflicting unacceptable losses, with even a limited nuclear strike also having 
such destructive consequences that it would deter an aggressor in a large-scale 
conventional conflict. Modern conventional precision weapons also have the capacity to 
inflict unacceptable losses in ‘demonstration strikes’, ‘limited strikes’, and the targeting 
of objects of critical importance. Ideally, the ability for conventional weapons, non-
strategic nuclear weapons, strategic nuclear weapons, and non-military tools [such as 
political or economic tools] to deter an opponent would provide a complementary effect 
with a great amount of added-value in the form of flexibility that a single domain, that 
is, nuclear capabilities, cannot solely provide on its own. Theoretically, strategic 
deterrence provides the Russian Federation with a flexible system that can deter and 
contain conflict in peacetime, wartime, and the times in between; with the possible risks 
of misallocation of domained tools conflating high and low level risks, being 
outweighed by the overall flexibility and effectiveness of the system. Explicitly, the 
Russian Strategic Deterrence concept prescribes the use of wartime tools in times of 
peace. That being said, Adamsky argues that there is a certain non-coherence on the 
categorization of what actions require a nuclear response, in terms of severity and 
impact. He also notes that there is a lack of streamlined integration with the national-
level deterrence strategy, which presents concerns on the monumentality of this task, as 
well as an asymmetric nature of the nuclear domain as a deterrence function, out of sync 
with the other constitutive domains in the holistic deterrence concept (Adamsky, 
2014a).  
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Moreover, non-military tools used in such a flexible arrangement, provide an increased 
signaling capability in their ability to provide more policy options to de-escalate 
conflict. Political, economic, informational, and other forms of pressure may be added 
in concert to influence a target to modify the situation at an earlier stage than the 
employment of military tools (Ven Bruusgaard, 2016). Adamsky (2014a) notes the 
emphasis placed on combining tools and domains, nuclear and non-nuclear tools used 
for signaling, non-military tools to increase pressure, etc; entitling this concept 
‘crossdomain coercive capability’. In another article, (Adamsky 2014b) Adamsky 
explains the effect that crossdomain coercive capability has on increasing deterrence 
credibility by increasing escalation ladder levels as de-escalatory potential, as, put 
simply; there are more signaling and de-escalatory options before military engagement 
and nuclear options (Adamsky, 2018). 
 
The newest and least-developed component of Russian Strategic Deterrence is the non-
military deterrence domain. The use of non-military domains: ‘economic, ideological, 
scientific, cultural, political, informational’ is intended to address the interrelationship 
between the functioning and actions of states in the international ecosystem. Ven 
Bruusgaard argues that the Russian theorists understand the nature of the political 
threats they believe they are facing, however she believes the way in which these 
measures would deter conflict is mechanically unclear. She notes that there is little 
detail in the theoretical writings that form her corpus, on how non-military deterrence 
would function, outside of the statement that the tool usage depends on the status of the 
target state in the international system. There is little to no categorization or assignment 
on which actions would cause non-military reaction or retaliation; nor how the non-
military tools would actually deter further aggression (Ven Bruusgaard, 2016). 
Adamsky agrees with this point implicitly, as while the Russian holistic conception of 
deterrence has additional non-military tools that may theoretically allow for the 
employment of options that would reduce a kinetic outcome; the approach itself is 
‘saturated with procedural deficits that, unless addressed, may lead to inadvertent 
escalation’ (Adamsky, 2018). Adamsky argues that this deterrence conception is in 
relation and response to the United States vis-a-vis NATO, and the soft arms race that 
occurs in posturing, technological innovation, and regional developments; influences 
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the formation of norms (Adamsky, 2014b). However, at the same time, he notes that this 
aforementioned dissonance, along with the incongruity of the different domains and 
their combination is a result of the consequence of the newness of this theory, which is 
still formulating and evolving itself. Further along this vein, are the second order effects 
of the chronological articulation of the theory, being a living, nascent theory: the theory 
itself should be understood within its intellectual history and the understanding of the 
semi-recent paradigm shift that spawned it (Adamsky, 2018).  
 
Regarding Russian Strategic Deterrence as a whole, there are questions on how 
effective are the communicative elements of Russian signaling. The usage of 
‘unacceptable losses’ as a predetermined metric of objective and success raises issues of 
miscommunication and conflict psychology, insofar much as the appearance of nuclear 
and non-nuclear blackmail and brinkmanship having a deleterious effect on the global 
perception of the Russian Federation; hypothetically impacting the receptiveness to cede 
to Russian demands. Furthermore, there is little consideration nor alternatives on the 
possibility that the tactics used would cause escalation instead of de-escalation, or even 
retaliation from military or non-military sources (Ven Bruusgaard, 2016). Even passive 
details such as the threat of nuclear first-strike, exacerbate the baseline tension level 
(Sinovets & Renz, 2015), which several NATO member-states have explicitly 
referenced in their threat perception (Haggard, 2019). Lastly, as a cumulative point, 
current Russian typology lacks a methodology for the ‘culminating point’, the point at 
which further escalation in counterproductive (Adamsky, 2018); hypothetically locking 
this paradigm into a brinkmanship set. 
 
2.2.2. Comparison to Western Deterrence Conceptions 
The most striking difference between Russian Strategic Deterrence and the previously-
mentioned Western deterrence conceptions is the Russian conception’s portrayal of war 
and peace as a spectrum, not as a binary categorization of success. Whereas the West 
categorizes the action-reaction paradigm as a metric regarding a measure’s efficacy, 
where deterrence has failed if the targeted action is not dissuaded; the Russian 
conception is objective-oriented and persistent, having additional measures employed as 
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a result to accomplish the deterrence. Ven Bruusgaard notes that the Russian Strategic 
Deterrence ideation has three unique features: universality, continuousness, and its 
combination of deterrent and coercive logic (Ven Bruusgaard, 2016). It is important to 
note that Russian Strategic Deterrence is linked explicitly to the projection and 
perception of Western deterrence measures and strategic actions. For example: New 
Generation Warfare, the use of cyber-domain, and information struggle is denoted as 
‘reflexive control’, when used in regards to holistic social consciousness and in 
reference to specific situations. This reflexive control is seen as the retaliation towards 
what is classified as ‘Information Warfare’ from the United States. This ‘information 
deterrence’ is still a relatively new concept, being not fully defined or elaborated upon; 
but it is a mechanism through which information warfare can be used to deter or prevent 
conflict (Adamsky, 2018).  
 
Russian threat perception focuses on a wide range of holistic actions, including 
domestic threats as both military danger and what is seen as Western subversion in the 
information domain targeting the domestic population; undermining ‘spiritual and 
patriotic traditions’(Russian Federation, 2014). Strategic vulnerability is a systemic 
theme throughout Russian threat perception, with regime change, military mobilization 
and exercises, as well as NATO military infrastructure moving Eastwards, and the 
possibility of a ‘prompt global strike’; included among the explicit threats to the 
Russian Federation. Regarding NATO, cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization is no longer seen as a vehicle through which collective security can be 
reinforced, as it was in the 2010 Russian military doctrine; now, it is characterized as an 
‘equal partner for dialogue’. Conversely, the 2014 Russian military doctrine emphasizes 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO], the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization [CSTO] as well as partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States 
[CIS] and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]. A vital 
sphere is interest is also mentioned, yet not entirely defined. Sinovets and Renz attribute 
this lack of specificity to a desire for strategic ambiguity; however, they also note that 
the mention of the explicit inclusion of the Arctic for the first time, betwixt this strategic 
ambiguity, as a significant point of establishment (Sinovets & Renz, 2015). 
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2.3. Chinese Deterrence Theory 
For the conceptualization of Chinese deterrence theory, this paper will primarily use the 
Minimum/Limited Deterrence theory [zuidi xiandu weishe/ youxian weishe] and the 
Strategic Deterrence theory [zhanlue weishe]. These concepts are used and elaborated 
upon by Chase, Chan, Erickson, Yeaw, Johnston, Ross, Hjortdal, and Fravel. The 
source material on the Chinese military doctrine itself primarily will consist of primary 
source documents regarding Chinese military strategy, translated publications by former 
Chinese military officers, and studies conducting analysis of Chinese military strategy 
and doctrine. These include studies and analysis conducted by Liang, Xiangsui, 
Finkelstein, Fravel, Medeiros, Heath, Gunness, Cooper, Bolt, Gray, Chansoria, 
Rinehart, and Singh. 
 
It is important to note that China lacks a public legal document such as the U.S. 
National Military Strategy that outlines its national strategic objectives and 
methodology; however the lack of legal basis does not impede the study of Chinese 
deterrence, as numerous white papers, speeches by senior officials, and articles 
published by officers serve a similar purpose, without the burden of legal constraint 
(Finkelstein, 2007; Fravel, 2008; Fravel & Medeiros, 2010; Heath, Gunness, & Cooper, 
2016). This lack of legal constraint allows for a certain level of advantageous strategic 
ambiguity (Rinehart, 2016). 
 
2.3.1. Chinese Strategic Deterrence 
Chinese Strategic Deterrence [zhanlue weishe] is a broad concept, containing a 
multidimensional combination of military and nonmilitary domains that constitute a 
combined ‘integrated strategic deterrence’ posture taking advantage of all elements of 
‘comprehensive national power’ [zonghe guojia liliang]. The objective of this 
deterrence strategy is ‘war containment’: ’pre-war crisis control, operational control 
during war, and stability control after war’, using whole-of-government methods to 
prevent the outbreak of war, and measures to contain its escalation (Heath, Gunness, & 
Cooper, 2016). A credible strategic deterrent, by this standard, includes nuclear, 
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conventional, space, and cyber capabilities (Chase & Chan, 2016). The important detail 
in this regard is that Chinese strategists view that the military domain has the most 
immediate and direct influential capacity to affect a potential adversary’s strategic 
calculus. That being said, Chinese military publications have repeatedly emphasized the 
use of nonmilitary domains as strategic deterrence domains, both separately and in 
support of military actions (Liang & Xiangsui, 1999; Chase & Chan, 2016). 
 
The framing of war is primarily conceptualized as war between comprehensive national 
power: a war between systems. Even if there is victory without war, it does not mean 
there is not a war at all. In broad strokes, these are economic wars, political war, science 
and technology wars, and diplomatic wars within the ‘war’ frame. The four national 
power sub-systems measured by Chinese analysts are material/hard power [national 
resources, economics, science/technology, and national defense], spirit/soft power 
[politics, diplomacy, culture, education], coordinated power [leadership, management, 
coordination of national development], and environmental power [international, natural, 
and domestic] (Liang & Xiangsui, 1999; Chansoria, 2009). There are 11 security 
domains: political, territorial, military, economic, cultural, social, scientific and 
technological, informational, ecological, financial, and nuclear. These reflect interests 
that have extended to the open-ocean, outer space, and cyberspace (Heath, Gunness, & 
Cooper, 2016). This comprehensive domain fusion for the purposes of war is 
characterized as the mobilization of national resources as a ‘people’s war’ and provides 
a ‘solid material and technological foundation’ for Chinese exertion of power (Chase & 
Chan, 2016). Naturally this has had overlap with the military performing non-military 
activities, and nonmilitary actors performing military/paramilitary activities; such as the 
formation of the Chinese Coast Guard from several non-paramilitary entities (Heath, 
Gunness, & Cooper, 2016). Cross-domain initiatives are primarily framed in main-
element/supporting-element(s) constructions where such things as electronic warfare 
and trade warfare can support conventional warfare. While primarily the main-element 
is military in nature, this is a general rule, not a set formula. In the Chinese conception, 
there is “almost no domain which does not have warfare's offensive pattern”. Likewise, 
supranational and intra-national means are explored as exploitable domains, as their 
interconnected nature to the state function is emphasized. It is stressed that every 
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domain can become a battlefield and that military action does not always have to be the 
primary action. As scholars, businessmen, and generals all can be actors and national 
tools; all domains can be a battlefield (Liang & Xiangsui, 1999) 
 
Chinese Strategic Deterrence is primarily framed in generalized, pre-established 
paradigms: regarding peacetime, times of tension, and wartime. The peacetime 
paradigm is characterized by ‘preventative deterrence activities’ that correlate to 
passive, enduring threats to China’s national security. The ‘peacetime deterrence 
posture’ uses China’s ‘comprehensive national power’ to maintain a ‘balanced 
relationship with the opponent for a relatively long period of time’. This ‘static 
deterrence capability’ allows for such actions as displays of strength such as military 
parades, exercises, official and unofficial media reports, etc. In times of tension, China 
shifts towards an ‘emergency deterrence posture’ to place threat upon an opponent, 
using ‘a dynamic deterrence capability’, which includes posturing and actions by the 
military and non-military domains in support. This is designed to signal resolve and 
willingness to fight, so that the adversary can reverse course at the last second. Notably, 
the strategic missile units attempt to exert pressure through public opinion in various 
public media to deter adversaries in peacetime and in times of tension. These ‘displays 
of strength’ are an integral part of the Chinese method. As the situational intensity 
increases, the deterrence actions increase accordingly; to the extent of carrying out 
cyber-attacks and even limited firepower attacks proximate to the enemy forces. The 
categorization of said attacks are correlated to how close the situation is to conflict. This 
would be supplemented with public broadcasts declaring intent to the foreign public and 
elite audiences, as to create upward psychological pressure onto leadership to capitulate 
to Chinese demands. This extends to the ‘all-out escalation’ paradigm, which orders 
silo-based missiles and other strategic weaponry for preparation; with the same media 
methodology. Posturing, in this regard, is an integral part of the signaling element for 
China; which operates under the assumption that it has the necessary time to actuate all 
steps of its deterrence strategy (Chase & Chan, 2016).  
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In all stages of a potential conflict paradigm, the advocation for a diplomatic solution, 
win-win scenarios, and to garner international support and action legitimacy is seen as 
paramount. This is done to minimize the externalities and consequences of actions 
taken; as the Chinese have concern for spillover from a crisis situation into other 
interests; even in victory. Ideally they would form a coalition of countries to deter the 
enemy, both militarily and in negotiated settlements. The act of ‘saving face’ is also of 
great importance throughout the process (Liang & Xiangsui, 1999; Chase & Chan, 
2016).  
 
The decision to escalate tensions intentionally is dependent on the potential to achieve 
political goals. Military and non-military force is used to achieve broader 
political/strategic objectives, and an emphasis is placed on the controllability of the 
situation where the military operations must be confined by political objectives at all 
times, or risk ‘domestic, political, economic, and social stability’ and may cause 
regional or global tension. The Chinese view a small controlled conflict as a potential 
action to prevent a larger conflict; should non-military activities fail; as to not escalate 
to a large-scale war, should deterrence fail. Ideally, conflict would be averted before it 
happens, and the root causes identified and resolved through cooperative mechanisms 
and participation in international security and diplomatic institutions; otherwise the 
conflict will be enduring and cyclical (Heath, Gunness, & Cooper, 2016).  
 
That being said, the Chinese do also note that ‘stability’ as a concept is not to be sought 
at all costs, advocating for the measured exploiting of crises and potentially using 
military clashes to improve China’s position strategically by protecting its interests and 
potentially finding the bottom line of an opponent. This brinksmanship and lack of 
context does contain a certain escalatory logic that may overestimate the Chinese 
confidence in their ability to control a conflict situation (Liang & Xiangsui, 1999; 
Heath, Gunness, & Cooper, 2016). 
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Chinese Strategic Deterrence also contains a linguistic component, in that the term for 
deterrence, ‘weishe’ also includes a similar ideation as the Western ‘compellence’ 
conception by Schelling (Chase & Chan, 2016). 
 
Active Defense is a keystone guideline in Chinese military doctrine. The principle 
behind Active Defense is that while China will not ‘attack unless attacked’, the 
definition of an attack on the strategic level, does not necessarily have to involve a 
kinetic attack; however China may respond kinetically on an operational level. Plainly, 
if China’s strategic or core interests are ‘attacked’ in a non-military fashion, it may 
attack pre-emptively in a military fashion as a response (Rinehart, 2016).  The goal of 
Chinese deterrence is to affect the adversary psychologically and destroy the will to 
fight, ideally before fighting occurs; and accordingly, the defense prioritizes attacking 
the foe far away from the mainland, to minimize damage to China. This has 
implications for their Nuclear No First Use policy (Chase, Erickson, & Yeaw, 2009).  
 
Nuclear Deterrence forms a rather dualistic cornerstone in Chinese thought (Singh, 
2016). It is simultaneously one of the most important types of strategic deterrence, 
being unmatched in its destructive potential; however, because of its potential for 
mutually assured destruction against another nuclear power, the nuclear deterrent is 
limited in its utility. The lasting impact on the user state’s political, economic, and 
diplomatic standing is seen as not desirous (Heath, Gunness, & Cooper, 2016). People’s 
Liberation Army [PLA] publications assert that conventional military deterrence, 
denoted as ‘real war capabilities’ [shizhan] (Ross, 2002) contains a higher degree of 
utility and flexibility, as they are not subject to the unique constrains and ramifications 
associated with nuclear weapons (Chase & Chan, 2016; Heath, Gunness, & Cooper, 
2016). 
 
The PLA portrays the cyber domain as especially important for strategic deterrence, as 
it allows China to reduce a high-tech adversary’s advantage in a hypothetical conflict. It 
has varied applications, such as challenging U.S. hegemony through norm competition 
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on its own, targeting adversarial logistical, communications, commercial, and critical 
infrastructure, as well as actions taken in support of an initiative in a military or non-
military domain; such as within the Active Defense framework (Chase & Chan, 2016). 
A computer-network attack [CNA] in computer-network operations [CNO] is seen as 
the ‘spearpoint of deterrence’, as it can increase the cost of a conflict to an unacceptable 
level before it has begun; thus deterring the opponent (Hjortdal, 2011).  Chinese 
military doctrine has prioritized information denial (except the information wanted to be 
given), strategic deception and achievement of psychological surprise for decades 
(Liang & Xiangsui, 1999; Chansoria, 2009). This, along with controlling the 
international media narrative, is considered ‘information deterrence’. (Liang & 
Xiangsui, 1999; Heath, Gunness, & Cooper, 2016). Chinese scholars argue that the 
‘information umbrella’ [xinxi san] is superior to the nuclear umbrella, as it is not 
similarly constrained; and can be used in peace and in war (Ross, 2002).  
 
It is important to note that many of the capabilities and processes regarding this strategic 
deterrence concept were mainly aspirational, as China did not have the physical 
elements to match the conceptual elements across many domains. This gap has lessened 
over the years, however it is currently unclear to what extent it has narrowed the gap; 
only that the gap is still significantly affecting the concept as a whole (Chase & Chan, 
2016). It is also important to note that the Chinese objective of winning without force, is 
caveated with limitations: “only when the deterring state has ‘extremely limited’ 
political objectives, when there is an ‘extreme power imbalance,’ and when the target 
has a ‘conciliatory attitude’” (Ross, 2002). Additionally, the native literature contains 
innate assumptions that the crises situational paradigm will provide enough time to go 
through all deterrence steps; as there is little writing on the circumstances that lack 
sufficient time. Regarding psychological pressure, there is also little literature on the 
topic of miscommunication, psychological backfiring, the implications of potential 
brinksmanship; as well as the innate assumption that the Chinese are immune to 
psychological pressure themselves (Heath, Gunness, & Cooper, 2016). 
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2.3.2. Minimum Deterrence and Limited Deterrence 
There is a debate on whether China uses the Minimum Deterrence (zuidi xiandu weishe) 
strategy or the Limited Deterrence strategy (youxian weishe). Minimum Deterrence is 
the ideation that a state should retain the minimum level of nuclear weapons required to 
ensure its sovereignty and deter war from nuclear and non-nuclear states (you qima de 
huanji shouduan); while simultaneously avoiding arms races. Comparably, Limited 
Deterrence ‘requires a limited war-fighting capability to inflict costly damage on the 
adversary at every rung of the escalation ladder, thus denying the adversary victory in a 
nuclear war’. Practically this is a slightly more flexible nuclear strategy with different 
nuclear tools for its deterrence purposes (Fravel & Medeiros, 2010). Both strategies 
repudiate the Mutually Assured Destruction conception, as ‘unacceptable losses’ is 
defined with a much lower threshold than ‘total annihilation’ (Chansoria, 2009). Both 
strategies have the goal of surviving a nuclear first strike (Chase, Erickson, & Yeaw, 
2009), with assured retaliation capabilities (Heath, Gunness, & Cooper, 2016). The 
mainstream view regards Minimum Deterrence is the primary approach, yet there is 
sufficient support to mention Limited Deterrence as an option (Fravel & Medeiros, 
2010). 
 
The relatively slow pace of evolution and articulation of nuclear strategy and doctrine 
can be explained by the imposition of precepts by Chairman Mao, the tumultuous 
context of the Cultural Revolution and its lasting impact, and the technological 
limitations of the industrial and educational base during the economic transformation 
(Chase, Erickson, & Yeaw, 2009). Chairman Mao primarily viewed nuclear weapons as 
tools to prevent a nuclear attack and prevent nuclear coercion; with the goal of having a 
second strike capability. This largely limited the development of nuclear strategy and 
explains much of the relative vulnerability of the nuclear arsenal and lack of 
survivability for several decades following China’s nuclearization. Chinese research 
regarding nuclear doctrine languished until the mid-1980s (Fravel & Medeiros, 2010).  
 
Practically, however, China has suffered greatly from limited institutional and logistical 
capacity regarding its nuclear tools, calling into question the survivability of the nuclear 
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weapons and ability for China to assure the retaliation component of its 
Minimum/Limited Deterrence strategy (Fravel & Medeiros, 2010). Furthermore there is 
little research published on how these concepts would work operationally, and it is 
repeatedly noted that China may lack the operational capacity to effectively conduct 
either deterrence strategy effectively, though that gap has been closing (Johnston, 1995; 
Chase, Erickson, & Yeaw, 2009; Fravel & Medeiros, 2010). The Chinese leaders 
themselves have minimal confidence in their second-strike capability, or even a first 
strike capability. The preparatory time required for either option take a significant 
amount of time that greatly risks detection and pre-emptive attack (Ross, 2002). 
Regardless, for China, nuclear weapons is not only a strategic necessity, but a 
prerequisite for international stature (Johnston, 1995; Finkelstein, 2000; Singh, 2016). 
 
The logic of Chinese Minimum/Limited Deterrence is as follows: learning from the 
mistakes of the Soviets attempting to match the U.S. in military spending, the Chinese 
have opted to pursue an approach that maximizes sufficiency and effectiveness, whilst 
attempting to minimize the potential for escalation and arms races. Accordingly, China 
does not have many nuclear weapons. The objective for both strategies is to prevent 
nuclear conflict and the escalation of such conflict with credible signaling (Chase, 
Erickson, & Yeaw, 2009), while at the same time, preclude the use of nuclear coercion 
against China. Chinese policymakers are acting under the assumption that the U.S. is 
not willing to risk nuclear war ‘at the cost of even a few American cities’, whereas they 
have said they are willing to endure more devastation (Bolt & Gray, 2007). 
 
China has a No Nuclear First Use [NFU] policy, however there is several debates from 
senior military leaders and strategists, on whether certain caveats warrant non-
observance (Rinehart, 2016), such as: a response to an attack on strategic nuclear sites, 
to deter external intervention in a Taiwanese crisis or conflict, catastrophic defeat in 
Taiwan, in response to breaches of territorial integrity (Chase, Erickson, & Yeaw, 
2009). Furthermore, the Active Defense strategy may have the Chinese use nuclear 
weapons in response to a non-kinetic attack, because the Chinese had been theoretically 
attacked strategically; thus fulfilling their No First Use phrasing, allowing them to 
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proceed with their own attack. (Heath, Gunness, & Cooper, 2016). Strategists have 
suggested that the NFU policy is mutable, as that it could be formally changed in 
response to regional and imminent threats as a tactic (Heath, Gunness, & Cooper, 2016). 
Lastly, the Chinese assert that if nuclear weapons are used against China, they must use 
nuclear weapons in retaliation (Ross, 2002). 
 
China’s NFU policy and advocation for the banning of all nuclear weapons may also be 
a pragmatic position, rather than a moral one. China does not have the technological 
supremacy or numerical value to win a meaningful nuclear conflict. Its comparatively 
weak position permits the Chinese to advocate for reduction, as it will affect the 
Americans and Russians to a greater degree than themselves (Bolt & Gray, 2007). 
 
2.3.3. Comparison to Western Deterrence 
While both Western Deterrence and Chinese Deterrence have the goal of deterring 
conflict, the difference lies in framing. The West attempts to prevent conflict, the 
Chinese attempt to win without firing a shot, due to imposition of indecision via 
psychological pressure. Whereas the West view war as a deterrence failure, the Chinese 
view war as another step in deterrence that may prevent a larger war from breaking out. 
Posturing, in this regard, is an integral part of the signaling element for China; which 
operates under the assumption that it has the necessary time to actuate all steps of its 
deterrence strategy. It appears to operate on a similar logic to the Psychological 
Deterrence conception; however, instead of taking psychology into account in the 
holistic sense, informing decision-makers; the Chinese variant uses military and non-
military actions to impose an overwhelmed psychological state. It is centered on China 
as the operative actor, wherein the object of deterrence is seemingly ascribed an inferior 
level of actorship, with the Chinese state seemingly impervious, or otherwise not 
afflicted by said psychological condition. 
 
China’s nuclear deterrence strategy is delineated above, where the Chinese prefer to use 
a minimal and limited countermeasure response to impose unacceptable losses; rather 
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than attempt to achieve dominance and a mutually-assured destruction threshold. The 
evolution and articulation of Chinese nuclear deterrence theory has been limited due to 
historical context and industrial capability. 
 
2.3.4. Comparison to Russian Deterrence 
Both Russian Strategic Deterrence and Chinese Strategic Deterrence have similar 
ideations of a spectrum of conflict; the primary difference being the Russian denotation 
of ‘struggle’ and explicit categorizations, whereas the Chinese imply the spectrum, but 
still use the word ‘war’. It does mention a seemingly similar ideation of ‘struggle’ 
within a competitive context, however this was an isolated incident. Chinese Limited 
Deterrence is similar to Russian Strategic Deterrence in conceptual framework, as they 
are both designed to address asymmetric power relationships in their respective regions; 
however, Chinese Minimum and Limited Deterrence operate at a much lower threshold 
of violence, as to impose unacceptable losses from a ‘sufficient’ level of a particular 
deterrence tool, rather than truly compete or dominate, as Russian Strategic Deterrence. 
This ideation extends to every operative deterrence element of Chinese Strategic 
Deterrence as well as Russian Strategic Deterrence. This difference, coupled with the 
repeated peaceful and non-directed contextual emphasis in the deterrence 
documentation, in conjunction with the emphasis on existing ownership of Taiwan, 
border regions, and Nine-dash line, implies both an independent normative frame, as 
well as a lack of relative capability independent of the delineation of the aspirational 
nature of its deterrence strategy in the Theoretical Framework corpus. The Russian 
Deterrence conception also contains a normative frame, however that frame is directly 
linked via opposition to NATO actions as illegitimate; while it does contain normative 
elements concerning multipolarity [as do the Chinese], this ideation is massively 
overshadowed by the oppositional frame. 
The framing of action initiatives of Chinese Strategic Deterrence is that of a main 
element with supporting elements, each having different utility and effectiveness in 
different contexts; whereas Russian Strategic Deterrence is conceptualized as an 
interchangeable spectrum of multi-domain tools for all contexts. 
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Both Russian and Chinese deterrence conceptions have issues of incompleteness and 
methodological deficiencies in regards to the actual deterrence mechanics of the 
strategies. Both states’ deterrence conceptions have aspirational qualities that reflect a 
current lack of integration, capability, and incomplete ideation. 
The framing of peace and war paradigms differ, in that the Chinese have set categorized 
deterrence denotations that they categorize action-reaction paradigms, whereas the 
Russians operate on a continuous spectrum of war and peace. This reflects the 
difference between Chinese emphasis on postural efficacy and signaling, whereas the 
Russian emphasis relies on objective-orientation. That being said, the non-binary 
objective-oriented litmus test for success for both models remains a commonality. 
 
2.4. Revisionism 
The definition chosen for revisionism for this thesis is Johnston’s formative conception; 
the majority of subsequent studies that explore revisionist and status-quo adherence 
explicitly reference this definition.  
“... a revisionist state is one which does not participate actively in major 
international institutions, which breaks the rules and norms of those 
international institutions in which it does participate, or which temporarily 
abides by the rules and norms but when presented with the opportunity tries to 
alter them in ways inconsistent with the original purposes of the institution and 
community…”. (Johnston, 2003) 
 
2.5. Status-quo 
The definition chosen for ‘status-quo’ is the logical opposite of Johnston’s revisionist 
definition; to reflect the polar opposite point. 
“a status-quo state is one that actively participates in major international 
institutions, which follows the rules and norms of those international institutions 
in which it does participate; and follows those rules and norms in ways 
consistent with the original purposes of the institution and community”. 
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CHAPTER III. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
This methodological section combines constructivist ideations of discourse framing and 
normative identification with deterrence theory conceptions of threat perception and 
subject-object pairing. It does so within a comparative study frame using Data-Driven 
Qualitative Content Analysis [QCA] as the primary empirical research framework. The 
following chapter contains the methodological framework, which includes the research 
design, research questions, corpus of data, research methods, and limitations. 
 
3.1. Research Design 
This comparative study uses Data Drive QCA to compare and contrast Chinese and 
Russian deterrence conceptions and applications of deterrence at key events within 
defined areas of interest to determine whether they can be categorized as revisionist or 
status-quo powers. The corpus of data is delineated and justified. Data-Driven QCA will 
be used to code the primary source deterrence conceptions with supplementary 
secondary source analysis. Limitations of the methodological framework are also 
explored. 
 
3.2. Research Questions 
The revisionist nature of the Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China is 
taken for granted in contemporary public and academic discourse, without the rigor of 
testing and evaluating that ‘fact’ by any meaningful metric. In the last 15+ years, the 
closest measurement on the degree of revisionism has been sector-based or issue-based 
adherence to international regimes, with the studies own authors denoting their 
difficulty in ascribing intent as to revisionist or pragmatist behavior, in light of the 
assertion that many status-quo powers seek to ignore many of the same binding regimes 
and applied norms as well (Walter, 2010).  
 
This issue of single-sector/instance focus in the background literature engenders certain 
issues of scale. While an event or sector may certainly provide some useful information 
as to the disposition of an actor in a specific instance, more data points are needed along 
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multiple vectors. This study seeks to test the degree of revisionist and status-quo 
behavior of these states as a function of the study of deterrence; a multi-dimensional 
facet of political action, whose holistic nature provides greater insight as to the 
dispositional attributes of the regimes. The conception and application of deterrence 
provides subject-object pairings and threat perception, which by definition, enlighten 
the audience as to the viewpoints of the state authors. This study will determine these 
threats; normative values, and desired outcomes, as they all provide concrete anchors 
from which operationalization of that corpus of data will create indicators to which real-
world events can be evaluated. To begin this methodological approach, the following 
research questions are posited. 
 
[1] What are the differences between the deterrence strategies of the People’s Republic 
of China and the Russian Federation? 
‘Differences’ refer to the substantiative divergence in the deterrence conceptions and 
outcomes of each state. The litmus test for these differences are delineated and defined 
by the ability of these differences to have an overall impact on the reference points and 
doctrinal actions taken by the state actor in question. For example: such differences in 
subject-object pairing, stated/observed thresholds for response, expressed desired 
outcomes (short/long term), overall outlook, measurements of success, severity of 
language and language content (as well as citation of international/regional/historical 
norms and precedent), valid retaliatory actions of self/other, etc. This question is the 
launching point for the following questions and sub-questions. 
 
[1B] Why might there be diverging drivers for deterrence conceptions/outcomes 
between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China? 
Naturally, this ‘why’ sub-question follows the ‘what’ parent question. As with any 
study, understanding the drivers on outcomes is of paramount importance in both the 
academic sphere and the public realm. The impact of specific combinations actors, 
influences, and actions have in regards to policy and reactions viewed through different 
theoretical lenses is of utmost relevance here. 
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[2]Can China and Russia ultimately be categorized as revisionist powers through their 
deterrence strategies? 
‘Ultimately’, in this case, refers to the both aspect of distinct finality, in terms of this 
paper, as well as the strategies being rendered down to the most basic level of 
measurement. ‘Strategies’ refers to both the conceptualization and application of 
deterrence by the state involved. This question evaluates the claims from the 
background literature, through the operationalized data correlations in the analysis. 
 
[2B] If China and Russia can be categorized as revisionist powers, to what extent? 
This sub-question is an extension of the previous question, with delineation and 
specification to follow. The answer to this question is relative, comparative to both the 
other state in this comparative study, as well as to the aggregate categorization markers 
in the data classification. This question satisfies and fills the gap in previous studies that 
sought to just simply denote Russia and/or China as revisionist or status-quo without 
qualifications, substantiations, or delineations.  
 
3.3. Data Selection 
The corpus of data to be collected, used, and analyzed will originate from the actions by 
the People’s Republic of China and Russian Federation during key events in areas of 
interest, primary source documents concerning those areas of interest within the overall 
deterrence conception, and secondary sources that provide either analysis or overviews 
of the events themselves. The ‘areas of interest’ in this study are designated as the coded 
variables that demonstrate indicators significant to deterrence, as defined by the data-
driven QCA from the national security documents themselves.  
 
The Chinese or Russian governmental real-world interactions within these ‘areas of 
interest’ will then be taken as data points, designated ‘key events’ to be cross-referenced 
with the deterrence conceptions and political-strategic precepts that were established 
previously in the study, to determine the adherence, practical application, mitigating 
factors, and overall result. It is important not to overlay the Western deterrence 
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conceptions onto these distinctly-original native deterrence conceptions, as it risks data 
contamination and value projection, and as such, data-driven case selection is the most 
relevant and appropriate to address this matter.  
 
In order to analyze and categorize the various conceptions of deterrence, I will be using 
the various ‘national security strategies’, ‘national defense concepts’, and their 
equivalents as primary governmental source documents as my corpus. These documents 
are the most relevant, reliable, and valid for the purposes of determining the official 
governmental stances of these states, as they are the official governmental publications 
on this subject matter. As deterrence requires a communicative element, issues of 
differing content in the various translations is not an issue; as the level of clarity put 
forth in the publication is a deterrence action in and of itself. As not every relevant 
primary governmental source national security document is made public in English, 
supplementary material will be drawn from academic literature surrounding said 
documents. While certainly reliance on supplementary material drawn from secondary 
sources is not ideal, in this case it is a matter of either doing with or doing without. 
 
This corpus of data will be used to compare and contrast Russian and Chinese strategic 
thought concerning deterrence. While using data-driven methodology to determine 
deterrence conceptions does much to discourage pre-emptive hypotheses and 
expectation overlay; such objectives as determining threat perception, direct and 
indirect objects of deterrence; level of aggression and posturing, as well as the means 
and methods of deterrence; are universal. The differences lie in application, values, 
acceptable targets and methods, measures of acceptability and success, etc. 
 
These ‘key events within areas of interest’ are both informed by and acted upon by the 
state in question, through the native deterrence conceptualization determining relevance 
of the indicator, as well as the state itself influencing the event. This is ultimately a 
measurement of the state’s adherence to its own doctrine. Naturally there will inevitably 
be mitigating factors, influencing this arrangement, as nothing in the regional and global 
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political ecosystems solely exist in a vacuum. However, deterrence documentation takes 
this into account as either the ecosystem as visualized by the state or a normative 
ecosystem desired by the state.  
 
Documentation concerning the official state responses and narratives for the 
operationalization of key events within areas of interest will predominantly prioritize 
governmental press releases, responses from senior governmental figures in their 
official capacity, academic studies that aggregate such data and governmental reactions 
to key events, reputable press sources that contain primary source references, as well as 
other items of literature or media that contains direct quotation or analysis of action 
regarding the primary source.  
 
These prioritizations follow the existing methodology in a preference for primary source 
material, with supplementary secondary source material if required. It is integral to take 
note of the governmental responses, as it informs the reliability and adherence to their 
deterrence doctrine; however the commentary and analysis in both academic sources 
and informed media sources provide a level of scrutiny and context that, while 
invariably biased to an extent and even projected; do provide valued interpretations 
within their argumentation. These will be used sparingly, in a supplementary and 
complementary context, if needed; as possible causal explanations in the event that 
there is major dissonance and conflict between the stated doctrine and the actions taken 
contra to said documentation. 
 
3.4. Timeframe of Case selection 
These cases will be primarily taken post-2014, after the so-called ‘Return of 
Geopolitics’; the oft-quoted point of departure in the relevant, associated academic 
literature. This point represents the key moment in which the issue of revisionism and 
geopolitics was widely acknowledged to have made its way to the forefront of the world 
scene (Zakaria, 2013). The roots are deeper, naturally, the most obvious and pressing 
case being the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. The enduring and contributing 
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influences to deterrence as well as the ideational forbearers as well as the deterrence 
conceptions themselves have obviously occur before 2014, however the vast majority of 
the actions responding to world events that contribute to this idea of contemporary 
revisionism are brought to the forefront during this specified time. Actions and events 
taken prior to 2014 will be acknowledged and brought into the corpus, however there 
will be an emphasis on cases concerning key events will be taken post-2014 as the 
primary focus to this point of departure. 
 
3.5. Research Methods 
The primary research frame used for this thesis will be the comparative study. In the 
background literature, both the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation 
have been compared in similar strokes as revisionist powers in several different studies 
and as status-quo powers in separate strokes in other studies. However, in the vast 
majority of studies, where they are mentioned together, they are ascribed similar 
qualities in broad strokes, as rising [or existing] regional powers with nuclear capability.  
 
The research method used in support of the primary research frame, specifically for 
coding and analyzing the national security documents will be Data-driven Qualitative 
Content Analysis (QCA). Qualitative Content Analysis is a methodological research 
technique that systematically describes the meaning of qualitative material by 
classifying said material as instances, subsequently put into categories of a coding 
frame. This reductive, systematic, and flexible method allows for vast quantities of data 
to be condensed into efficient and manageable portions that are then ideally placed for 
comparison, both from document to document and from case to case. Qualitative 
Content Analysis is the most suitable method for this study, because the analysis of 
these state documents on deterrence requires coding with the ability to understand, 
analyze, and explain the nuances within. Quantitative coding lacks the ability to process 
this nuance, and it lacks the ability to measure the significance of the coded variables; 
the numeric value of the instances of a specific keyword has little bearing on the 
intensity and nuance regarding the attitudinal approaches of the author, particularly in 
translated material. This QCA will be data-driven, as deterrence is a broad concept that 
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is applied across a study of different countries with differing historical, military, and 
cultural backgrounds. Additionally, it is important to develop the coding frame from the 
data itself, as these native conceptions are significantly different from the Western 
conceptions of deterrence, and as such; the coding frame needs to be built from the 
deterrence documentation given by these states, rather than a projection or 
superimposition of non-native conceptions, expectations, and norms onto the object of 
research. Moreover, the actual coding will be derived from the conceptualization and 
categorization specifically or implicitly invoking deterrence within the document, 
especially if any status-quo and revisionist aspects are mentioned or implied. Implicitly 
in this case would both include sub-conceptualizations of deterrence within a 
‘deterrence’ section, and references with the exact established deterrence, specific to the 
definition constructed. The latter being essentially: the deterrence classification 
establishes the definition, and that potential deterrence reference is compared to the 
definition; and if it is referential to the established definition, it would be classified as 
deterrence. The codes themselves will be descriptive, not limited to any specific unit 
length; as the conceptual basis of brevity and explanation may differ in the English 
translation of a document originally written in Mandarin or Russian. These codes will 
be used to develop indicators as the operationalization of the coding frame, to classify 
and determine to what extent the state follows its deterrence strategies and what form 
that deterrence strategy takes in practice. 
 
As this study is data-driven and derived from native conceptions of deterrence, it 
normally would be difficult to create an initial hypothesis, however; based on the 
background literature and theoretical framework, the initial expectation is that China 
will have a softer-bounded approach, regardless of the degree of status-quo or 
revisionism expressed, due to their minimum/limited deterrence conception. On the 
other hand, comparatively, the Russian approach will appear to be more emphatically 
aggressive as a result due to their strategic deterrence conception; again regardless of 
their level of status-quo or revisionism expressed. 
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3.6. Limitations 
The most obvious and present limitation in this study is the relatively short sample size 
of the timeframe in which the main corpus of evidence resides. Indeed, this does limit 
the study insofar much as it predominantly relies upon specific native deterrence 
documentation to categorize and determine empirical results, there is a legitimate 
criticism in the fact that prior influences, events, and trends are largely relegated to a 
supplementary frame. That being said, this is the first comparative study of its class 
concerning the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation in the last 15+ 
years, there needs to be a starting point to launch subsequent studies, in terms of 
precedent. An anthropological or anthological study would be appropriate for a study 
focused on a singular one of these state actors, not a new comparative study. Moreover, 
a significant section of the results of this study both indirectly and directly, evaluates the 
validity of the so-called ‘Rise of the Rest’ concept, necessitating the post-2014 scope. 
 
The selection of the study of deterrence, while excellent as a study of strategic-level 
coordination of efforts, broadly ignores the interrelationships concerning the effects of 
positive economic and political relationships; particularly ones that involve states that 
are among the targeted objects to be deterred. However, the world economic regime, as 
a whole, being an international system in which the Russian Federation and People’s 
Republic of China are irrevocably embedded, does, by its own nature as an open 
economic system; serve to both obfuscate and inundate academics and practitioners 
studying it, with widely varied and conflicting data concerning the level of ‘buy-in’, that 
the actors have in such a system that is nigh-mandatory to international wealth and 
power. It does little to specify and qualify the nature of positive and negative economic 
relationships as a function of political relations, nor does it, outside of egregious 
circumstances, properly delineate the practical applications of good and bad faith state 
economic actions without the superimposition of non-native norms. As such, ascribing 
positive and/or negative intent or meaning solely through an economic dimension 
suffers through the need for qualifiers to determine the contextual basis for those actions 
and the intent behind them. Without a proper official governmental responses, the 
increase of the price per unit of energy export to a state by another state could be 
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punitive, profit-driven, or due to budgetary needs. Additionally, at what threshold of 
percentage increase in price, lead to a determination of state action and intent? 
Conversely, the ascription of positive political relations due to positive sectoral 
interaction and import/export are difficult to determine purely economically as many 
interactions, particularly with specialization or resource export are due to the 
requirements of circumstance and pragmatism. 
 
The use of a deterrence dimension as a supplementary qualifier can put these actions 
into perspective, however, the sheer volume of economic interrelationships; would 
better be suited to have the deterrence dimension as the primary focus of research, with 
the economic dimension as its supplementary. However, this does lead to a quandary of 
having to develop a metric to which extent a positive economic interaction bypass a bad 
interaction, and to what level each influences the other, which again references the 
afore-mentioned good/bad faith problem. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, these 
economic interactions must be parsed and filtered solely through the lens of the 
deterrence dimension to negate this quandary; resulting in only using those economic 
actions that fit as a deterrence action in this dataset. 
 
Coding is the operative component of QCA. It allows for the reduction of information 
into its most basic units, providing a concise approximation of the intent of a body of 
literature. Unfortunately, there is an inherent data cost, as it relies almost entirely on the 
coder. This subjectivity is unavoidable, as QCA primarily focuses on discerning 
meaning, which is subjective in and of itself. To mitigate the effects of coder 
subjectivity, I have focused the coding frame as well as the re-cycling action therein, 
into subject-object pairings, avoiding the use of charged projective words to describe 
actions, and prioritized the usage of the documents’ own wording. Invariably, attitudinal 
ascriptions onto other actors and actions are necessary, however the deterrence 
documents themselves offer much in the way of repeated justification along several 
vectors approaching the subject-object discourse frame. 
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CHAPTER 4. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
The following section contains a two-part comparative analysis on the findings of the 
study, as well as the testing of the hypotheses. 
 
4.1. Russian Federation: Data 
The national security documents used for the analysis are the 2014 Military Doctrine 
and the 2015 National Security Strategy. These documents are, at the time of the writing 
of this thesis, the most current and up-to-date primary source material on deterrence 
from a public Russian governmental source. While there are preceding deterrence 
documents, the purpose of this analytic component is to develop a current state-of-the-
art to be compared to the Chinese model of deterrence, and actions therein; and such 
inclusion of a chronological survey risks affecting the analytic cohesion, at such a 
formative juncture; as this is the first study of its kind. The 2014 Military Doctrine, 
naturally is a boilerplate document, upon which generalized declarations are made as to 
the import and legal basis for deterrence as well as the official stances of the Russian 
Federation are made. The 2015 National Security Strategy is a more practical document, 
defining the different domains of security/deterrence/struggle, threat perception, 
normative agenda, and worldview. 
 
4.2. Russia: Areas of Interest 
The deterrence documents implicitly reference the status-quo of the international system 
and explicitly invoke several revisionist stances; which is significant in and of itself. It 
also provided several areas of interest to test the conceptual precepts. Notably, there is 
no mention of Syria at all in the documents. 
 
4.2.1. The Arctic 
The Arctic was deemed important in the both documents. The Russian Military has built 
475 military sites in the Arctic in the past six years (TASS, 2019). While there is much 
concern for Arctic militarization (Ilyushina & Pleitgen, 2019), from NATO member-
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states; Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made explicit note at the February 2019 Munich 
conference that while the Russian Federation is concerned about NATO objectives in 
the Arctic, they believe that established regional cooperation in the Arctic does not 
require an additional military component (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019). 
The creation of military bases and other supporting infrastructure in the Arctic is 
consistent with the 2009 Russian Federation’s Policy for the Arctic to 2020. At the same 
time, the results likely to prove inconclusive, insofar much as their ability to discern 
whether such Arctic militarization would be seen as revisionist or status-quo, as the 
construction of said bases and infrastructure are on the Russian Federation’s own 
territory, and border security is the prerogative of any state. Even if the construction of 
military infrastructure was accelerated due to East-West tension, the fundamental 
critical structural question remains. A similar issue arises from the enduring semi-
regular interception of Russian military aircraft near Canadian and American borders 
via the Arctic(TASS, 2018b; ABC News, 2018; CBC, 2018), these military patrols’ 
presence within international waters, even close to other states’ borders, is not 
conclusive as to the attributional status of the state as a whole. 
 
4.2.2. Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
In both defense documents, the explicit recognition of the statehood of the Republic of 
Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia play a key role in Russian foreign policy, 
especially as it pertains to common defense vis-a-vis the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization [CSTO], and separately, with regional integration efforts via the EEU, and 
the CIS. As of May 2018, 5 states have recognized the two previously-Georgian 
breakaway regions: Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru; in chronological order. 
Vanuatu and Tuvalu had previously recognized the independence of these regions, 
however they withdrew said recognition as they established official diplomatic relations 
with Georgia in 2011 (TASS, 2018a). Naturally, the Republics of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia recognize each other; and there are other de-facto and unrecognized states that 
recognize the two polities as legitimate, however these are not included in the number, 
even by Russia. Additionally, the context in which the states broke away from Georgia, 
namely, the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, was generally seen as a Russian move to prevent 
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Georgia from being eligible to attain NATO membership (Isachenkov, 2018; Atlantic 
Council 2018); a move that was expressed as desirous by both Georgia and NATO 
(NATO, 2008). This motion has carried onwards and had been reaffirmed in successive 
NATO summits (NATO, 2019)  The official Russian casus belli was the defense of 
civilians, many of whom had Russian citizenship; an internationally recognized 
normative action. However, the mass passportization beforehand, in incredible numbers 
in the preceding months to, and subsequent years from, the invasion in the regions of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, suggests an intentional subversion and exploitation of 
international norms (Natoli, 2010) to supply a manufactured casus belli as de facto ‘bio-
colonization’, into an otherwise internal affair (Artman, 2011; Nagashima, 2017). 
Regardless of arguments of maintaining a status-quo of the current number and 
positioning of NATO member states in relation to the neighborhood of the Russian 
Federation; the passportization action directly preceding the conflict, the circumstances 
of the war itself, and subsequent continuous official recognition of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia despite international non-recognition by 97.4% of UN member states; 
constitutes revisionist actions. 
 
4.2.3. Ukraine 
As per the 2015 National Security Strategy, the blame for the conflict in Ukraine rests 
on the shoulders of the United States and European Union, for their support for the 
‘anti-constitutional coup d’etat’ and resulting second and third order effects. The 
annexation of Crimea explicitly not mentioned, despite happening the year before the 
document’s release. That being said, it is integral to the Ukrainian situation, and will be 
included in this section. 
 
The official state rhetoric in this regard is that subsequent to the ‘illegal coup’ and 
ousting of Yanukovych, ‘volunteers’ formed armed militias in Eastern Ukraine and 
Crimea, attempting to defend themselves against the ‘far right’ and the ‘fascists’ in Kiev 
that took over the ‘legitimate government’. Subsequently, the Crimean government held 
a referendum for independence, and following its overwhelming assent; the Crimean 
government then petitioned the Russian Federation to be absorbed and incorporated 
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(Myers & Barry, 2014; Vidmar, 2015). The United States (Pifer, 2014b) and European 
Union contest this narrative (Council of the European Union, 2014; PACE, 2014) 
heavily, and claim subversion of the Ukrainian state and several violations of 
international norms and law, as well as bilateral and multilateral agreements concerning 
the territorial integrity as well as other requisite territorial understandings [See: 
International Treaties]. The international community predominantly condemns this 
move, with a substantial neutrality. The UN general assembly passed a non-binding 
resolution, with 100 votes in favor, 11 against, with 58 abstentions out of 193, declaring 
the Crimean referendum invalid (Charbonneau & Donath, 2014). Furthermore, the vast 
majority of the Crimean Tatars native to the Crimean peninsula, which constitutes 12% 
of the Crimean population, abstained from voting in the resolution, citing the illegality 
of the motion (Saluschev, 2014; BBC, 2014a).  
 
Considering the rapidity in which the referendum and annexation took place after the 
deposition of Yanukovych, in reference to the Russian defense documents’ precepts; the 
quick referendum and annexation appears to be quite opportunistic, compared to the 
alternatives. The repeated and pointed emphasis the Russian Federation put upon the 
international system and international norms regarding diplomatic resolution in the 
official security documents implies a disposition desirous to use said international 
conflict resolution system for addressing grievances and discussing solutions. The 
classification of the deposition of Yanukovich as a coup d’etat, as a challenge to the 
validity of the governmental change; would qualify that situational paradigm to be 
eligible for OSCE, UNSC, or many other international vehicles for conflict resolution, 
mandate-generating, and paradigm-shifting action; to say nothing of bilateral and 
multilateral attempts at conflict resolution with the relevant parties. While there are 
arguments that the Western support for the transition would likely make the efforts 
unsuccessful, the swiftness in which the Russian Federation enacted their military 
intervention and flash referendum seemed to discount the process entirely, as the 5 days 
after the 22 February ousting of Yanukovych and the 27-28 February seizure of key 
Crimean governmental buildings and airports by pro-Russian gunmen, the so-called 
‘Little Green Men’ and 22/24 days after the 16 March referendum for Crimean 
secession and subsequent absorption on 18 March by the Russian Federation (BBC, 
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2014c; Al Jazeera, 2014) are too short and the events too rapid for any reasonable 
international actor to conclude that the Russian Federation is attempting to resolve the 
situation through any international vehicle or peaceful resolution. Moreso, considering 
that a week after the 22 February ousting, on 1 March, the Federation Council 
unanimously approved President Putin’s request to use the Armed Forces of the Russian 
Federation on the territory of Ukraine and Crimea; (Lenta, 2014; Reuters, 2014) shows 
that from the official, formal side, that 7 days were given at a theoretical maximum, for 
a hypothetical resolution, if it were to be so attempted; ignoring all of the informal, 
legal-adjacent factors operating at that time.  
 
Conversely, this short timeline implies that the Russian Federation is acting unilaterally 
to present the world with a fait accompli, rather than adhering to the precept of 
exhausting all non-military measures before applying military force as per the afore-
mentioned official documents. Even potential mitigating circumstances, as given in the 
Russian statement of reason for the annexation (Marxsen, 2014; Vidmar, 2015) for the 
protection of Russian-speaking peoples and Russian civilians, fall short; as the risk to 
Russian citizens abroad at that time was fairly minimal, with a lack of present and 
imminent danger to the public, shortly after the ousting.  
 
The deployment of unmarked military personnel under no flag presents issues of 
attribution, yet also of responsibility; considering the 2014 Military Doctrine as to the 
protection of compatriots abroad. This overarching logic extends to Eastern Ukraine, 
specifically the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, where the Russian government has 
encouraged and supported the separatist movements with both military, legal-adjacent, 
and political actions and non-actions (Bebler, 2015; Trenin, 2016). The 2014 Military 
Doctrine explicitly allows for the protection of Russian citizens [along with an 
ambiguous term: ‘compatriots’] abroad, as is consistent with international norms, along 
an identical vein to which the Russian Federation claimed its involvement (Vidmar, 
2015). If Russian troops were deployed openly under explicit invocation of this 
international norm and legal basis, then there would be an argument to be made in favor 
of the status-quo; or at least, a factor against revisionism. The lack of identification 
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implies that there is not an official basis for deployment; or that there is insufficient 
cause. Moreover, the excuse that the soldiers were volunteers (Oliphant & Sabur, 2015; 
Engel, 2015) falls short, as the loss of control of personnel and matériel to the extent of 
invading a neighboring country and establishing separatist movements and regimes 
would be decried as unacceptable by any reasonable state, especially the state from 
which they originated. The nonchalance from the Russian government implies 
responsibility. Furthermore, aside from the identification of equipment specific to 
Russian Armed forces [highly likely to include the 45th Guards Separate 
Reconnaissance Regiment of the VDV] (Pulkki, 2014); the incredibly large amount of 
medals given to ground troops at a time when the Russian Federation was not overtly 
fighting a war against any other state [The Russian Federation did not begin overtly 
operations in Syria until September 2015, whilst the periods of time in this study 
precede this time], implicates Russian military involvement (Gregory, 2016). President 
Putin even admitted the presence of Russian military intelligence officers, after the 
capture of two such individuals by Ukraine; as well as the presence of the Russian army 
in Crimea, supporting the ‘local defense forces’ at the time of the referendum (Oliphant 
& Sabur, 2015; Walker, 2015). 
 
The post-factum narrative that Crimea was historically a part of Russia and was given to 
Ukraine as a mistake during Soviet times (Myers & Barry, 2014; Sasse, 2017; Ragozin, 
2019), also does not carry much weight; as Putin had roughly 14~ years to make 
overtures and significant actions before the annexation, yet did more in one month than 
in those 14 years; implying opportunism over the political circumstances in Ukraine, 
rather than the continuation of efforts to return Crimea to Russia through internationally 
normative channels.  
 
The deployment of unmarked, non-attributed troops by the Russian Federation into 
Ukraine and Crimea, flash referendum and annexation into the Russian state, incitement 
and support for separatist activities; all within a brief period of time impossible for the 
international conflict resolution system explicitly and repeatedly mentioned in official 
Russian state documents to adequately address, with no reasonable, mitigating 
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circumstances; continued denial, and post-factum arguments for normalization; all while 
denying involvement, constitutes highly revisionist actions. 
 
4.2.4. The Maritime Environment 
Special import has been given to the maritime regions as ‘transportation arteries’ as a 
potential strategic zone of interest in the 2015 National Security Strategy. However, 
upon further investigation, the preponderance of material concerning the maritime 
environment, regarding Russia are generalized economic vectors with potential non-
deterrence political ramifications (Economist, 2019; Bechev, 2019), aforementioned 
concerns about Arctic militarization (Gramer, 2017), general issues regarding such non-
interstate deterrence state functions as addressing the actions of non-state actors, state 
functions regarding immigration, and combatting terrorism (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2009). 
Outside of this majority, the most relevant incident regarding revisionism and the status-
quo is the incident and circumstances surrounding the ramming of a Ukrainian vessel, 
subsequent boarding, and capture of its crew, by the Russian FSB Coast Guard (Pifer, 
2018; Troulliard, 2019). The initial incident took place within overlapping Crimean and 
Russian territorial waters within the Sea of Azov as per the maximum distance allotted 
by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, whereas the final boarding 
and capture of Ukrainian sailors took place in international waters (Cruickshank, 2018). 
The Russian Federation and Ukraine had signed a 2003 treaty concerning the Strait of 
Kerch and Sea of Azov, granting free passage to Ukrainian and Russian vessels; whilst 
recognizing the areas as both Russian and Ukrainian territorial waters (BBC, 2018; 
Cruickshank, 2018). Considering the fact that the ultimate seizure of Ukrainian sailors 
and their vessel in international waters, 2003 treaty that grants passage to the Strait of 
Kerch and Sea of Azov regardless, and the circumstances surrounding the Russian 
annexation of Crimea and intervention into Ukraine; the actions surrounding the 2018 
incident concerning the capture of Ukrainian sailors by the Russian Coast Guard are 
deemed to be revisionist. 
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4.2.5. Special Services 
The 2015 Russian National Security Strategy mentions that “increasingly active use is 
being made of special services” potential. This section will evaluate the use of special 
services as an area of interest. While it is difficult to properly address the scope of 
actions by intelligence services, given the nature of intelligence work, this study will 
primarily focus on the specific circumstances and actions that have the potential to 
violate international treaties and contradict the other specific markers that the Russian 
government placed in its national defense documents concerning its normative ideals. 
The potential lack of complete data in this regard is not an insurmountable issue, as the 
existence of violations ascribes revisionist qualities.  
 
Simultaneously, the actions that do not constitute violations or are not provable 
violations, do not confer the status-quo attribution in this particular case; as any 
particular frequency ratio of violations to non-violations are overshadowed by the 
import of the egregiousness of said violations. 
 
The poisoning of Sergei Skripal, a former Russian military intelligence officer and 
double agent, and his daughter Yulia in Salisbury, England is one such action. On 
March 4, 2018, the Skripals were found unconscious on a public bench, and upon 
admission to the hospital and analysis, it was determined that they were exposed to 
Novichok, a Soviet-developed nerve agent (Schwirtz, 2019). The British authorities 
determined that the poisoning was a premeditated action by 2 GRU agents on behalf of 
the Russian Federation through CCTV footage (Pérez-Peña & Barry, 2018). The United 
Kingdom declared that the use of Novichuk on British soil constituted a breach of the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction; otherwise known as the ‘Chemical 
Weapons Convention’ [CWC]. As a result, the British government, along with 28 other 
governments, expelled a total of 153 diplomats; an otherwise unprecedented number 
(Chugtai & Petkova, 2018). The British government further included the incident as 
relevant to their threat perception paradigm in their 2018 National Security Strategy 
(HM Government, 2018). 
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The Russian government denied these allegations, and repeatedly asserted that the two 
men were tourists. They attempted to reverse the dialogue, claiming that the British 
government is violating international law by refusing to provide access to the Skripals 
to Russian consular officials. The British government refused, citing that Yulia Skripal 
did not wish to see the consular officials; and that the location of the two will remain 
secret, referencing the attempted murder. The Russian government refutes those claims, 
and asserts that the British government had not provided the necessary level of evidence 
to prove their claim (Schwirtz, 2019).  
 
The CCTV footage of the two individuals, subsequent identification, chemical analysis 
of the nerve agent, and record expulsion of Russian diplomats; coupled with the 
lackluster Russian response in the face of said evidence and flimsy alibi, indicates a 
serious revisionist action as the violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (art 1. 
sec. 1b) for an assassination on foreign soil is an egregious break of international norms 
and concord. 
 
The apprehension of four GRU officers by Dutch authorities on April 13, 2018 for 
attempting to conduct a cyber-attack on the Organisation for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons [OPCW] headquarters building (Viswantha, Colchester, & Volz, 
2018) also constitutes another such action. The Dutch authorities found specialist 
hacking equipment, a mobile phone activated nearby GRU headquarters in Moscow, as 
well as a taxi receipt from thereabouts as well, in the vehicle in which the officers were 
apprehended. Further investigation revealed that the men were traveling on diplomatic 
passports and were met at the airport by a Russian embassy official (Henley, 2018). 
This constitutes a revisionist action, especially in the context of the poisoning of the 
Skripals earlier in the year, as the OPCW building is where an investigation of said 
poisoning was occurring at that time. 
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The requisite Russian actions in Ukraine and Crimea are covered under the support in 
the ‘Ukraine’ section. 
 
The Russian government was also accused of conducting a worldwide cyber campaign, 
which included misinformation campaigns, cyber-attacks, and document releases. The 
governments of New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom accused the Russian 
military for conducting ‘reckless’ cyber-attacks, including the 2017 Bad Rabbit 
ransomware attack, the 2016 Democratic National Convention [DNC] hack, and the 
World Anti-Doping Agency [WADA] cyber-attack. The governments included GRU-
linked aliases associated with the cyber-attacks. (Berlinger & Dos Santos, 2018). The 
hack of the DNC was further confirmed by the Mueller investigation, which noted that 
tens of thousands of stolen documents were released under Russian-controlled aliases 
(Hendry, 2018).  
 
Special Council for the United States Department of Justice Robert Mueller criminally 
charged 13 Russians and 3 Russian entities including the ‘troll farm’ known as the 
Internet Research Agency. The Mueller investigation accused them of several crimes, 
including identity theft to purchase advertising (Swaine, 2018), creating and 
disseminating memetic images for political use, and staging dozens of rallies for and 
against particular issues with contact with hundreds of unwitting American proxies 
(Lee, 2018); as well as deliberately spreading misinformation to exacerbate existing 
cleavages in American society (Birnbaum, 2019). The ‘troll farm’ at the center of these 
allegations is the ‘Internet Research Agency’, a state-run organization (Myers & 
Evstatieva, 2018). The organization was taken seriously to extent that U.S. Cyber 
Command hacked the Internet Research Agency during the day of the 2018 Midterm 
Elections and the days shortly thereafter so that it would not interfere with said election 
(Barnes, 2019). The interference in foreign elections; the hacking, theft, and 
dissemination of confidential files; as well as the continued spread of misinformation 
and attempted fomenting of dissent in the form of setting up political rallies across both 
sides of a myriad swath of issues constitutes revisionist actions. 
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The illegal and legal-adjacent actions conducted by Russian intelligence, including the 
poisoning of the Skripals, which constitutes a violation of the CWC, attempted hacking 
of the OPCW headquarters building, Russian intelligence supporting the separatist 
movements in Ukraine, and sustained global hacking campaign; including interference 
the U.S. Election, deliberate spread of misinformation in foreign elections constitutes 
severe revisionist actions. While the misinformation component may be a function of 
the ‘informational struggle’ component of Russian Strategic Deterrence; the 
contradictions between Russian governmental actions and the expressed Russian desire 
for non-interference in their own affairs concerning actions  “destabilizing the domestic 
political and social situation” insinuate further revisionist behavior, as the discrepancy 
between Russian stated action and their emphasis on the “preservation of the stability of 
the system of international law and the prevention of its fragmentation, attenuation, and 
selective application” (Russian National Security Strategy, 2015). 
 
4.2.6. International Treaties  
The Russian defense documents repeatedly invoke the supremacy of international law, 
with specific importance given to the security-related treaties to which the Russian 
Federation is party, with a special concern regarding with arms control. This analysis 
section is concerned with determining the validity of accusations of non-adherence to 
the treaties that qualify as relevant under the afore-mentioned Russian defense 
documents; post-2014.  
 
The Russian Federation has been accused of violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces Treaty [INF Treaty] (Pifer, 2014a), by the United States, in 2008, 2014, and 
2017 (Congressional Research Service, 2019). The INF Treaty prohibits ‘intermediate-
ranged and shorter-ranged ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched 
cruise missiles’. Intermediate-ranged is defined as missiles that have a range between 
500-5,500 kilometers. Additionally, the INF Treaty classifies every associated variant of 
a missile capable of intermediate range, as well as its launchers; with the intermediate-
ranged classification, even if they are altered for other purposes, or are otherwise not 
capable of performing that mission. Furthermore, if a single ballistic/cruise missile had 
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been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery; all missiles of that type will 
henceforth be classified as weapon-delivery vehicles (Schneider, 2014; Congressional 
Research Service, 2019). The reported accusation violations are as follows: In 2008, the 
R-500 missile [part of the Iskander-M]; in 2014, the Obama Administration claimed 
violations of the treaty, but did not specify a weapon system; and the Trump 
Administration recorded violations in 2017, however, they also did not specify the 
specific missile at issue [the RS-26 was not determined to be the missile in question in 
the 2017/2018 Compliance Reports] (Congressional Research Service, 2019). The 
missiles that are alleged to be in violation of the INF Treaty are the 3M14, 9M729, 
‘Bastion’, and the R-500. Normally, it is rather difficult to confirm the technical 
qualities and capabilities needed to prove violation of such an arms treaty via 
journalistic sources and even statements from foreign governments. However, in 
November 2017, the Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army Valery 
Gerasimov, revealed that the Russian Federation had “set up full-scale units of vehicles 
capable of delivering precision-guided missiles to targets located up to 4,000 kilometers 
away.” Additionally, in the same month, ‘Russia Beyond the Headlines’, owned by 
Rossiya Segodnya, a state-run news organization; confirmed reports that the range of 
several missiles using the Iskander-M missile system are in the prohibited range of the 
INF Treaty stipulations: “Each [of the] various missile[s] can be charged with a 
warhead packed with up to 500 kilo[s] of high explosive, which can destroy enemy 
military bases and ground forces up to 600 km away”. However, due to technical details 
of the definition of the range component for ballistic missiles, it is unclear if this is a 
violation or circumvention (Schneider, 2017). Regardless, the testimony of the Russian 
Chief of General Staff, as well as a confirmation of missile ranges via a state-run media 
organ; constitutes admission of either circumvention or violation. The enduring 
monetary cost for research and development, length development cycles, expertise, 
deployment, training, and testing of the missiles and missile systems; exhibits a high 
level of intentionality to this state action. While it is difficult to discern if the actions 
taken by the Russian Federation are circumventions or violations of the INF treaty, 
either option is considered revisionist for the purposes of this thesis. 
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The Charter of the United Nations is a formative document in international law and 
normative values; one that is referenced explicitly and repeatedly in the Russian 
national security documents. The UN Charter is also a document that is referenced 
frequently concerning Russian violations of international law with respect to Ukraine 
(Marxsen 2014; Bebler, 2015; Vidmar, 2015; Yost, 2015). The article in question of 
violation is Article 2, Section 4: “All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations” (U.N. Charter art. 1, sec. 4). As established above, the territorial 
integrity and political independence of Ukraine had been violated by the Russian 
Federation under the aforementioned circumstances. Given the repeated emphasis on 
the formative and boilerplate nature of the Charter in the Russian national security 
documents; this fact lends itself more emphatically to the continued revisionist 
ascription to the Russian Federation’s ‘International Treaties’ section. 
 
In regards to the 2003 Treaty Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on 
Cooperation in the Use of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait, the actions of the 
Russian FSB Coast Guard concerning the 2018 Kerch Strait incident were deemed to be 
revisionist [See: The Maritime Environment]. Additionally, the Russian government 
was deemed to be in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention for the 2018 
poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal. Accordingly, the action is deemed to be a serious 
revisionist action due to the deployment of a nerve agent on foreign soil for the 
purposes of assassination [See: Special Services]. 
 
Regarding the Russian Federation’s specific commitments to respect Ukraine's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, the two predominant agreements in question are the 
multilateral 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances and the bilateral 
Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership of 1997. 
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The 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances is a multilateral agreement 
between the Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States, and Ukraine 
concerning security guarantees against the violation of territorial integrity, threat, or use 
of force against the operative state [Ukraine], in accordance with the 1975 Helsinki 
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE]. Ukraine 
inherited the third-largest nuclear stockpile in the world, after the fall of the Soviet 
Union. The Ukrainian government expressed a desire to denuclearize with a 
simultaneous concern about the potential for a Russian nuclear monopoly in the post-
Soviet space. The United States, United Kingdom, and Russian Federation therefore 
extended security guarantees to Ukraine for the denuclearization of the state and return 
of the Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia (Budjeryn, 2014). The operative clauses of this 
memorandum concern the respect of the independence and sovereignty of the existing 
borders of Ukraine, as well as a prohibition on the threat and use of force against the 
territorial integrity and/or political independence of Ukraine, and proscription on the use 
of economic pressure for political effect. Potential mitigating circumstances in this 
regard are matters of self-defense, and matters in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations (Marxsen, 2014; Yost, 2015). 
 
As mentioned in the ‘Ukraine’ section, the Russian military intervention qualifies as a 
use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine. It has 
also used economic pressure both in the past, both with energy resources and limited 
sanctions as a consequence of the intervention in Ukraine. The sovereignty of Ukraine 
was further violated with the annexation of Crimea and support for separatists both in 
Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine. As mentioned before, there are no mitigating 
circumstances; including self-defense, nor a relevant clause in the UN charter. 
Additionally, the final clause concerning consultation concerning the afore-mentioned 
clauses; was violated, as Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister boycotted the 
consultation called by Ukraine in early 2014.  
 
In regards to the Russian response, Mr. Lavrov gave a press conference on 26 January, 
2016; where he stated that the Budapest Memorandum only contained one obligation: 
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not to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Furthermore, he claimed that the Russian 
Federation had not signed the Budapest Memorandum with the current government of 
Ukraine; and was not bound by it, as a result.  This interpretation of the memorandum 
contradicts with the text of the document itself. The assertion that the governmental 
change disqualifies it from all existing treaties with the Russian Federation goes counter 
to international norms concerning the treaty obligation of states. Furthermore, this 
would require the Russian Federation to renegotiate and re-sign every agreement it has 
with other states at the change of government of every state; (Pifer, 2016). These actions 
appear to intentionally attempt to subvert and alter the original purpose of the treaty, 
consistent with the definition of revisionism used in this thesis.  
 
The Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership of 1997 is a bilateral treaty 
between the Russian Federation and Ukraine that unconditionally guarantees the 
territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of each state. It further codifies the 
assurance of non-use of force, threat of force, including economic means of pressure 
(Stewart, 1997; Nation, 2000; Marxsen, 2014). 
 
As with the Budapest Memorandum of Security Assurances, the Russian Federation has 
violated the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership with its military 
intervention, economic pressure, annexation of Crimean, and support for separatist 
movements in the Ukrainian state; without mitigating circumstances permissible under 
the treaty. 
 
Thusly, given the stakes of the Ukrainian situation and the flagrant violations of 
international norms, as well as the repeated violations of the Intermediate-Ranged 
Missile Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention, Charter of the UN, an allegedly 
formative and core document to the Russian Federation’s National Security documents; 
violation of bilateral agreements concerning territorial integrity and political 
independence, as well as shared use of maritime regions; violation and attempted 
circumvention of the Budapest memorandum; the overall classification of the Russian 
Federation’s actions in the ‘International Treaties’ section is ‘Highly Revisionist’. 
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4.3. China: Data 
The national security document chosen for the analysis is the 2015 white paper: China’s 
Military Strategy, released by the PRC State Council Information Office. This 
document was chosen as the most current and relevant primary source material, owing 
to the particular strategic document paradigm detailed in the theoretical framework. The 
document contains normative elements, strategic disposition, and core deterrence 
interests; largely regarding maritime and regional interests. 
 
4.4. China: Areas of Interest 
The deterrence document implicitly references a passively changing status-quo, and the 
dedication of China to adhere to international norms/obligations and to preserve peace 
and stability. It simultaneously denounces hegemonic actions and power politics, 
framing it as a threat to world peace and stability. This implies a perception of a 
different status-quo, as a multi-polar order, rather than a unipolar order. It also has a 
bifurcated level of clarity, with normative values being vague and ambiguous, while 
core strategic interests being abundantly clear. 
 
4.4.1. Border Disputes 
China has had a vast history of border disputes, owing to both historical context, as well 
as its sheer number of neighboring countries. It has since resolved most of these 
conflicts officially (Tweed, 2018), with the majority of the remaining conflicts being 
related to demarcation of Exclusive Economic Zones and territorial waters claims. The 
sea-borders will be covered in the ‘Maritime Rights and Interests’ section. 
 
The remaining existing active border disputes are largely Sino-Indian, owing to 1890 
convention, which was based on a faulty cartographic survey (Joshi, 2017). After the 
1962 Sino-Indian War, there have been numerous clashes, standoffs, and regular 
incursions by both sides; continuing to present day. Chinese and Indian actions have 
largely been reciprocal in this regard, with incursions and minor violations being the 
norm (BBC, 2014b; Miglani & Bukhari, 2014; Joshi, 2017; The Economic Times, 
66 
 
2018). However, in 2017, the Chinese army attempted to build a ‘motorable road’ in 
disputed Doklam/Dokalam; violating a 1998 agreement not to ‘disturb the status-quo of 
1959’ (Jennings, 2017; Joshi, 2017). This incident is clearly in violation of said 
agreement, though due to its isolated nature, and the long-standing reciprocal paradigm 
with assertions over the disputed regions; this section is categorized as ‘slightly 
revisionist’. 
 
4.4.2. National Unification 
The Chinese insistence on national reunification with Taiwan is a key point made in the 
document. This paradigm is rather unique given its nature and the history of state 
recognition regarding the Republic of China [ROC/ Taiwan] and the People’s Republic 
of China. It is one paradigm for a separatist movement to carve out a territory, as the 
document implies; it is quite another for a state to lose recognition, as Taiwan has. ROC 
was globally recognized as ‘China’ for decades, before the PRC established diplomatic 
relationships with other states, conditional upon the acceptance of its ‘One China 
Policy’. Now, only 17 states recognize Taiwan. Even the United States, the security 
guarantor of Taiwan, does not recognize the state officially (Australian Government, 
2019). Chinese actions in this regard are largely limited to military exercises within its 
own borders/international waters, economic/political influence, and the exceedingly rare 
airspace encroachment (Zhang, 2019; Rodrigo, 2019). It is exceedingly difficult to 
ascribe attributes to state interactions with internationally-insinuated de-facto non-states 
with such unique history, given the lack of precedent. Therefore, there is insufficient 
data for a meaningful analysis. 
 
4.4.3. Developmental and Overseas Interests 
China explicitly and repeatedly references its developmental and overseas interests in a 
broad, vague sense as a core interest requiring its defense umbrella. These interests are 
primarily economic, supporting the larger Chinese economic growth model: trade, 
investment, energy, the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as the safety of the 120 million 
Chinese tourists and 40 million ethnic Chinese living abroad (Yung, Rustici, Devary, & 
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Lin, 2014; Heath, 2018). Chinese actions in this regard, are the establishment of several 
military bases abroad in support of economic, protective, and anti-piracy operations. 
The Chinese prioritize safety and stability in regards to their overseas/developmental 
interests, with a marked disinterest of interfering in local affairs (Yung, Rustici, Devary, 
& Lin, 2014; Heath, 2018). It is important to note that the establishment of bases 
overseas and PLA expeditionary capability is still in a nascent stage. Even so, the 
establishment of foreign bases via agreements with the host-nation is entirely normal. 
As such, the categorization given to the section is ‘Status-quo’. 
 
4.4.4. Maritime Rights and Interests 
China repeatedly and explicitly emphasize their maritime rights and interests throughout 
the 2015 Military Strategy as a key strategic interest; attempting to delegitimize foreign 
claims on disputed maritime regions in the South and East China Seas. The disputed sea 
regions include the Spratly Island, Senkoku islands, Scarborough Shoal, Paracel islands; 
as well as other myriad groupings of island masses. There are a host of claims from 
several states in the region, all claiming historical precedent, whether on a legal basis or 
from historical territory holdings (Jennings, 2017; Tweed, 2018; Romaniuk & Burgers, 
2019). The relevant Chinese actions identified here are the building of artificial islands 
to take advantage of the international norm concerning territorial waters, the occupation 
and building of military and civilian infrastructure on the disputed and artificial islands, 
and paramilitary patrols over the disputed and artificial islands.  
 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS] arbitration tribunal 
ruled against Chinese claims, including the so-called ‘9-dash line’ in Philippines vs. 
China, in 2016. The tribunal did not determine ownership of the islands or create 
boundaries; the outcomes were predominantly focused on classification and validation 
of claims. China declared it would not take part of the arbitration and has since 
categorically rejected the ruling; despite being a party to UNCLOS (Phillips, Holmes & 
Bowcott, 2016). 
 
68 
 
China has been building artificial islands and reefs in the South China Sea for the better 
part of a decade, with subsequent occupation and militarization of both disputed and 
artificial landmasses; necessitating military and paramilitary maritime patrols for the 
securing of said landmasses (Romaniuk & Burgers, 2019). Legally, via UNCLOS; 
artificial islands are not considered as ‘rocks’ for the delineation of territorial waters and 
the legalities of sovereignty and passage concerning said categorization. However, 
China has been enforcing the UNCLOS norms concerning territorial waters and its 12 
nautical miles enforcement paradigm on both areas classified as ‘rocks’ as well as the 
artificial islands that do not have the classification; contravening the norm (Tiezzi, 
2015). 
 
The non-participation in the UNCLOS arbitration process and rejection of the result is 
considered a revisionist action due to China being a party to UNCLOS. Furthermore, 
China implicitly recognizes the legitimacy of the UNCLOS arbitration panel, as it has 
been providing its judges to said panel for decades (Odom, 2017).  The building of 
artificial islands and reefs, and subsequent enforcement of the territorial waters 
paradigm where the paradigm is not legally justified; where the legal document 
explicitly states it is not legally justified (Part 2, Sec. 2, Art 11.), is considered a highly 
revisionist action. The occupation and militarization of disputed islands is considered a 
highly revisionist action as it attempts to force a fait accompli, in a region that 
represents a third of global shipping (China Power Team, 2017), instead of going 
through the established arbitration process to which China is party. These actions, being 
directly analogous to clauses of the revisionist definition used “which breaks the rules 
and norms of those international institutions in which it does participate, or which 
temporarily abides by the rules and norms but when presented with the opportunity tries 
to alter them in ways inconsistent with the original purposes of the institution and 
community”, result in the ‘Maritime Rights and Interests’ section to be categorized as 
Highly Revisionist. 
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4.4.5. Korean Peninsula 
China frames its interest in the Korean Peninsula as concern over instability and 
uncertainty; though it limits its concerns to ‘terrorism, separatism, and extremism’; 
explicitly ignoring the North-South paradigm and U.S. involvement, outside of a 
generalized reference to the U.S. ‘rebalancing strategy’.  
 
China has historically aligned with North Korea, the so-called ‘Blood Alliance’, after 
their respective communist revolutions; aiding them in the Korean War, and acting as 
their security guarantor, continuing to present day (Wibawa, 2019). The reasons are 
threefold: Opposition to U.S. influence, maintaining regional stability, and the 
development of China’s own influence (Chenjun & McGregor, 2019). China is opposed 
to the continued U.S. influence in its regional backyard, and seeks to prevent Korean re-
unification, as it would likely be on the South’s terms; thereby removing the buffer-state 
between China and South Korea/United States. China heavily prioritizes stability in the 
Korean peninsula, and economically sustains the North Korean regime; as the collapse 
of said regime would cause a colossal refugee and humanitarian crisis, the brunt of 
which would be borne by China. Even a North Korean economic collapse, such as in the 
1990s, would be devastating to the Chinese economy; not to mention the potential 
fallout from the consequences of war or even nuclear exchange (Nanto & Manyin, 
2010; Chenjun & McGregor, 2019). Lastly, the economic leverage that China has over 
North Korea, though nebulous in its efficacy in comparison to North Korean 
brinksmanship; supports the Chinese precept in the deterrence document, about 
opposing arms races of any type, especially nuclear races. The presence of external 
security guarantors: China and the U.S. and their influence on both sides, theoretically 
and empirically discourages the neighboring states from seeking internal security 
guarantees; such as nuclear weapons. 
 
While attempting to maintain regional stability and pragmatically advancing your own 
regional influence over rivals is not revisionist; contravening a dozen UN and UNSC 
resolutions regarding sanctions regimes against North Korea, concerning forbidden 
imports, exports, and financial/economic restrictions (Schoff, 2019); is considered 
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revisionist. There are legitimate arguments to be made for mitigating circumstances, in 
the pragmatism expressed and personal stake involved with China economically 
propping up the North Korean regime, in the significant negative economic and 
humanitarian costs at the potential collapse of the regime, and international obligations 
to prevent humanitarian crises. Therefore, the categorization given to this section is 
‘Moderately Revisionist’. 
 
4.4.6. Outer Space 
The defense document repeatedly references outer space as an area of interest, however 
the paradigm is mostly posturing and aspirational; reflecting the aspirational nature of 
the doctrine discussed in the theoretical section. Regarding capabilities, China has a 
modest space program, no militarized aspects in space, and has invested into ground-
based anti-satellite weaponry (Hussain & Ahmed, 2018); which is legal under current 
international law (Chatterjee, 2014), and even is a necessity to safely dismantle any 
aging satellites (Hussain & Ahmed, 2018). China has also signed all-bar-one UN 
treaties and conventions on space, and is a member of the UN Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The treaty in question, 1979 Moon Treaty only has 11 
signatories (Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 2014). Thusly, the 
classification of China’s actions in this ‘Outer Space’ section is ‘Highly Status-Quo’. 
 
4.4.7. Cyberspace 
China has consistently and emphatically reiterated the importance of cyberspace and the 
actions taken for security therein, in the deterrence document. Their characterization is 
predominantly defensive in nature, and notes the importance of international 
cooperation. 
 
Chinese actions in this regard are the hackings of private and public institutions globally 
with said cyber-attacks including, but not limited to: compromising integral systems for 
the functioning of foreign governments, IP theft, mass-identity compromise, theft of 
diplomatic and state communications. The integral systems include the attributed 
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compromise of U.S. critical infrastructure systems (Finkle & Bing, 2018; Sabur, 2019). 
The IP theft includes public, private, and military sources in North America, Europe, 
and Asia (Finkle, 2015; CSIS, 2019; Jinhua, 2019) with condemnation from the U.S., 
U.K., New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the EU, and Japan (CSIS, 2019). Cyberattacks 
resulting in mass identity compromise has generally been limited to U.S. companies and 
governmental agencies (Finkle, 2015; Sabur, 2019). The theft of diplomatic cables and 
other state communications includes the Russia-U.S. summit, EU diplomatic cables, and 
multiple elections in Southeast Asia (CSIS, 2019). 
 
While mass identity compromise and the theft of diplomatic and state communications 
are indirectly addressed as non-desirous against China in the 2015 China’s Military 
Strategy document, the actions themselves do not technically fit the definition of 
revisionism used in this thesis. The theft and inappropriate access to information, while 
publicly decried by most states; is not necessarily fit the norm paradigm in regards to 
international organizations; as there has been no evidence of attempts at electoral 
manipulation, only theft of information. However, on the other hand, compromising 
integral systems for the functioning of foreign governments, does violate the ability for 
the state to maintain sovereignty, as critical infrastructure is integral to the actual 
functioning of the state logistically. As the cyber-intrusions were limited to 
prepositioning efforts to lay the groundwork for future attacks, and not to attack the 
critical infrastructure itself; the outcome was limited. However the targeting of critical 
infrastructure in the first place is revisionist, as it denotes a potential use of force or 
threat to affect the sovereignty of a state; contravening the UN Charter (U.N. Charter 
art. 1, sec. 4). In regards to the continual IP theft and economic espionage, regarding the 
US in particular; China has violated a bilateral 2015 US-China Cyber-agreement 
(Jinhua, 2019), specifically concerning the precept of ‘refrain from conducting or 
knowingly supporting cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property’ (The White House, 
Office of the Press Secretary, 2015). This constitutes a violation of the bilateral 
agreement, and thusly is a revisionist action. As a result, the categorization for the 
‘Cyberspace section’ is revisionist. 
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4.4.8. International Obligations 
China puts an emphasis on fulfilling its international obligations with a focus on 
cooperation in the national security document. This characterization is simultaneously 
concrete and broad in its delineation: with specifics such as ‘strictly observe the 
mandates of the UN Security Council as well as the particulars of humanitarian aid, and 
regional organizations it prioritizes; on the other hand, ‘Faithfully fulfilling China’s 
international obligations’, ‘do their utmost to shoulder more international 
responsibilities and obligations’, and ‘contribute more to world peace’; is ill-defined. 
For the purposes of this study, the explicitly-defined evaluable data of the UNSC 
mandate adherence, as well as the implicitly-defined evaluable data of the adherence to 
UN, regional, bilateral/multilateral, and other binding agreements to which it is party; 
will be used to determine the categorization. This section is partially derivative of the 
other sections, reflecting the interconnected nature of Chinese conceptualization in the 
deterrence document. 
 
China has been a comparatively passive actor in the UNSC, using its veto a total of 12 
times, with 8 of those vetoes pre-2014 (Dag Hammarskjöld Library, 2019). This has 
been attributed by authors to a cautiousness on the over-exercise of such power 
(Holland, 2012). 2 out of 3 solo vetoes, all of which took place before 2014 (Dag 
Hammarskjöld Library, 2019), were conducted purely in opposition to states that 
supported Taiwan. China instead generally uses the abstention to show its disapproval 
(Holland, 2012). China has predominantly adhered to the UNSC mandates, with the 
notable enduring exception of North Korea, as noted in the ‘Korean Peninsula’ section. 
Taking into account the general passive approach and preponderance of adherence to 
UNSC mandates with one notable, continuous exception with mitigating circumstances 
as mentioned in the ‘Korean Peninsula’ section; the categorization of China’s UNSC 
adherence is one step down from the related section: ‘Slightly Revisionist’. 
 
China’s interaction within the formation of various resolutions and declarations of the 
UN, are predominantly value-driven (Deng, 2015); with the requisite deterrence-related 
sectors generally relegated to the UNSC. The exception to this rule, are the UNCLOS 
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South China Sea paradigm, evaluated ‘Highly Revisionist’, covered in the ‘Maritime 
Rights and Interests’ section, and the treaties concerning the use of Outer Space, 
evaluated ‘Highly Status-quo’ covered in the ‘Outer Space’ section. 
 
Likewise, the bilateral treaties concerning the Sino-Indian border dispute was covered 
under the ‘Border Dispute’ section, resulting in the ‘Slightly Revisionist’ categorization. 
The bilateral US-China cyber agreement violation is revisionist, under the ‘Cyberspace’ 
section. 
 
China identifies 6 regional organizations/associations in the deterrence document as 
important to its international obligations: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
[SCO], ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus [ADMM+], ASEAN Regional Forum 
[ARF], Shangri-La Dialogue [SLD], Jakarta International Defence Dialogue [JIDD], 
and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium [WPNS]. Of these organizations, only the 
SCO qualifies for evaluation due to the non-binding and platform nature of the rest of 
the organizations/associations: they are merely meeting platforms for dialogue for the 
formation of bilateral and multilateral discourse (ASEAN, 2007; International Peace 
Institute, 2013; Odom, 2017); and as such do not meet the standards for the evaluation 
of revisionist/status-quo norm and rules adherence. The SCO predominantly addresses 
non-state issues, such as anti-terrorism and anti-separatism; state aspects generally refer 
to solidarity in regards to protecting the sovereignty of member-states and opposing 
intervention in member-state affairs on the basis of human rights violations or 
‘humanitarianism’ (Gill, 2001; Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2001). While China 
has adhered to this precept in its UNSC voting pattern (United Nations Security 
Council, 2019), the invalidation of almost all organizations/associations and minor 
relevance of the SCO to deterrence; renders an ‘Inconclusive’ result. 
 
Taking into account the disparate results of the sections and sub-sections that constitute 
this section, the result for the ‘International Obligations’ categorization is ‘Mixed’. 
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4.4.9. Regional Stability 
The deterrence document repeatedly emphasizes regional stability in various 
characterization: through a function of Chinese non-instigation and defensive nature, 
that would produce regional stability and peace. However, the operationalization of this 
section, due to the interrelated nature of the afore-mentioned sections results in a gestalt 
of the ‘Maritime Interests’, ‘National Unification’, ‘Border Disputes’, ‘Korean 
Peninsula’, ‘International obligations’ via regional organizations/associations, and 
‘Cyberspace’ via affected regional actors, sections. The interplay between China’s fait 
accompli tactic with the artificial and disputed islands, treatment of maritime norms, 
border disputes, cyber-attacks and electoral/diplomatic monitoring, actions in the 
Taiwan paradigm all render results similar to the mutually exclusive categorizations 
above, as mitigating effects of the context of the Korean paradigm and participation in 
regional security organizations serve to act as a summative result rather than an 
independent section. As such, the result is a ‘Mixed’ categorization. 
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4.5. Results  
RU Area of 
Interest 
Result CN Area of Interest Result 
Arctic Inconclusive Border Disputes Slightly 
Revisionist 
Abkhazia/South 
Ossetia 
Revisionist National Unification Inconclusive 
Ukraine Highly 
Revisionist 
Developmental/Overseas 
Interests 
Status-quo 
Maritime 
Environment 
Revisionist Maritime 
Rights/Interests 
Highly 
Revisionist 
Special Services Highly 
Revisionist 
Korean Peninsula Moderately 
Revisionist 
International 
Treaties 
Highly 
Revisionist 
Outer Space Highly Status-
quo 
  Cyberspace Revisionist 
  International Obligation Mixed 
  Regional Stability Mixed 
Fig.1 Results of Findings 
 
4.6. Research Questions Answered 
This section will answer the research questions posited above in light of the findings of 
the study. 
 
[1] What are the differences between the deterrence strategies of the People’s Republic 
of China and the Russian Federation? 
The conceptual differences from the ‘Theoretical Framework’ section have led to 
different empirical outcomes. The outcome variance predominantly encompasses the 
overall levels of revisionism, of international norm/law adherence within areas of 
interest, of obfuscatory elements, and of kinetic outcome. Russia has an overall higher 
level of revisionism than China, consistently acting in a revisionist manner across 
almost all areas of interest as a modus operandi; whereas China appears to act in a 
revisionist manner in reference to gaining advantage in core strategic interests. This is 
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also reflected ideationally, with significantly more emphasis place in predictability and 
the maintenance of peace and stability in Chinese theoretical documentation, compared 
to Russian theoretical documentation. Russia attempts to obfuscate and deny its 
revisionist actions through denial and misdirection; while China remains relatively open 
about its actions, even in cases where it acts in a revisionist manner [aside from Cyber, 
which is an intelligence dimension, and generally is not admitted regardless]. Lastly, 
there is a marked difference in the level of kinetic action between the two states: Russia 
supporting separatist elements in Ukraine military, conducting assassinations, and 
interfering with foreign governments; compared to China’s occupation-based fait 
accompli in the South China Sea and information-theft via cyber. 
 
[1B] Why might there be diverging drivers for deterrence conceptions/outcomes 
between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China? 
Both China and Russia have enduring territorial and historical legacies that drive their 
deterrence policies as well as deep asymmetries between themselves and their 
competitors. China is operating in a paradigm against several passive, separate regional 
actors with disparate territorial claims, and one global actor with no territorial claims; 
creating a comparatively-low pressure environment. Russia is operating in a paradigm 
where its former satellite states are attempting to leave its sphere of influence into a 
rival security/economic organization, changing the geopolitical balance.  
 
This paradigm difference allows for China to pursue a more controlled and measured 
approach, in Active Defense; as explained by the innate assumptions in the deterrence 
literature on the comparatively-slow pace of posturing and escalation, the implication 
being that the deterrence will likely be done on its terms, or controlled to a favorable 
outcome. Its Minimum/Limited Deterrence theory is a reflection of ideology delaying 
further research to a point where the outcome of the Soviet case could be taken into 
account. This measured approach is evidenced by the slow, decade-long assertion and 
occupation of disputed and artificial islands in the South China Sea, the enduring border 
disputes, lack of reunification, cyber/information operations, and continued support for 
North Korea. These actions are methodical and represents a lower-pressure paradigm. 
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Russia inherited its nuclear arsenal, which made the nuclear deliberation unnecessary. 
In response to a more unified adversarial front, Russia attempts to act as a first mover 
(McLellan, 2017), to impose the afore-mentioned unacceptable costs onto its opponents 
through Strategic Deterrence to overcome this asymmetry. Russian actions demonstrate 
unpredictability, as a unitary actor against coalition actors that desire predictability 
[demonstrated in the responses to Russian deterrence actions]. Russian risk/pain 
thresholds are much higher than its opponents as demonstrated by the repeated violation 
of international norms with little effective response [effective defined as deterring 
Russian revisionist actions], allowing it to continue its deterrence logic. This first mover 
logic drives many of the deterrence actions surrounding Ukraine, Crimea, as well as 
influencing elections and performing intelligence operations. By acting unpredictably 
and forcing a fait accompli, while maintaining deniability and using non-military 
actions such that other nations would have a higher political cost threshold to respond; 
Russia is able to address this deep asymmetry. 
 
 [2]Can China and Russia ultimately be categorized as revisionist powers through their 
deterrence strategies? 
Yes, both states can be categorized as revisionist. Through identification and 
measurement of the key events informed by areas of interest as indicators of status-
quo/revisionist categorization; both China and Russia qualify as revisionist states. 
Russia received categorical ‘revisionist’ and ‘highly revisionist’ results in all-but-one 
area of interest, with the non-revisionist result lacking sufficient data to make a 
meaningful evaluation. China received mixed results that skewed revisionist in 
aggregate, however, when taking into account the scope and weight of each area-of-
interest, the extensive impact and enduring aspect of such dimensions as cyberspace, the 
occupation and enforcement of illegal territorial waters paradigms of disputed and 
artificial islands in the South China Sea, and the support of North Korea vastly 
outweighs China’s limited space program and the nascent development of overseas 
bases and overseas operations. Both states, despite the emphasis on supremacy of 
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international law and adherence to international norms; have repeatedly and egregiously 
violated said norms in multiple dimensions. 
 
[2B] If China and Russia can be categorized as revisionist powers, to what extent? 
Russia has consistently acted in a highly revisionist manner across all of the 
determinable indicators drawn from its deterrence documentation. The flagrant, 
continuous, and deliberate nature of the strategic actions taken across many regions and 
in many cases of varying intensity; denotes a disregard for international rules and 
norms, regardless of whether Russia is party to the norms or not. The blatant disregard 
for the bilateral and multilateral agreements to which Russia is party, the repeated 
infringement on the sovereignty of other states both digitally and violently, and the use 
a chemical weapon for an attempted murder on foreign soil; all contribute to the ‘highly 
revisionist’ state categorization for Russia. The only higher possible designation would 
be a circumstance where a state would reject participation in international organizations 
and associated norms as a whole. 
 
At first glance, from the results, it would appear that China leans revisionist. However, 
as explained in research answer [2], the differences in weighting and scope shows that 
China’s actions in references to core interests predominantly are varying levels of 
revisionist. This reflects a pragmatic adherence to international norms and standards 
when it is not disadvantageous to the state, however; when potential lasting advantages 
or core interests are concerned; China does not hesitate to act in a revisionist manner. 
Thusly, the overall categorization for China is ‘revisionist’, markedly less than Russia’s 
‘highly revisionist’ label; as the egregiousness of the Russian incidents vastly 
outnumber and outweigh the Chinese incidents. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis sought to determine the level of status-quo or revisionist attributes that the 
Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China exhibited through the use of 
deterrence study as an explanatory lens. Through a research process that involved Data-
driven Qualitative Content Analysis to determine Areas of Interest that in turn, revealed 
key events that were then analyzed; this thesis was able to determine that both Russia 
and China are revisionist states, with Russia being significantly more revisionist. This is 
due to the differing nature of its security environment and enduring historical and 
military legacy; prompting Russia to attempt to act as a ‘first-mover’, to gain the 
initiative and impose ‘unacceptable losses’ as well as obfuscation, to deter 
counteraction, in the face of a coalition-based adversary, that consists of many former 
satellite states in its historical sphere of influence, and to overcome the innate situational 
asymmetry between itself and NATO/EU. China, on the other hand, due to its security 
environment containing relatively weaker, individual regional actors and a global actor 
in the US; and a comparative lack of nuclear and military ability to enforce its claims, 
attempts a more slow and measured approach; largely declaratory and with assertions of 
legitimacy. This paradigm has developed a postural paradigm, where Chinese 
documentation takes for granted the slow pace of its environment and has developed its 
conceptual strategy and conducted its empirical actions accordingly.  
 
In addition to determining the revisionist nature of Russia and China, this thesis 
demonstrates the potential for use of deterrence study as a viable vehicle to determine 
the status-quo and revisionist nature of a state, and contributes to the literature on 
revisionist studies as a whole by opening up an entirely new sector of study for analysis. 
This thesis is a valuable proof-of-concept for future research, concerning studies on 
revisionism that operationalize and measure the differences between strategic 
conceptions and guidelines to the empirical result. Additionally, this is the first holistic 
[not focused solely on a single aspect] study on revisionism in over 15 years, and the 
first comparative study that attempts to measure the specific levels of revisionism of its 
cases. Measurement-based revisionism studies provide leaders and scholars a scientific 
and useful tool for decision-making and transferable quantifications to future studies, 
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both chronological and lateral. This thesis provides a model for such studies, and forms 
the foundation for such research. 
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APPENDIX I. CODING FRAME 
 
Doc. Meaningful Unit Condensed MU Codes Use Category 
2014R 3. The legal basis of the 
Military Doctrine consists of 
the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation, generally 
recognized principles and 
norms of international law and 
international treaties of the 
Russian Federation in the field 
of defense, arms control and 
disarmament, federal 
constitutional laws, federal 
laws, as well as statutory legal 
acts of the President of the 
Russian Federation and the 
Government of the Russian 
Federation. 
Legal basis for 
document includes 
invocation of 
international laws, 
norms and treaty. 
International Norms.  
 
International Treaties.  
 
International Law. 
 
Legal Basis. 
Y Precept 
2014R 5. The Military Doctrine 
reflects the commitment of the 
Russian Federation to taking 
military measures for the 
protection of its national 
interests and the interests of its 
allies only after political, 
diplomatic, legal, economic, 
informational and other non-
violent instruments have been 
exhausted 
The military is a 
last resort for 
protecting interests 
after all other non-
military 
instruments have 
been used. 
Military Last Resort Y Precept 
2014R 9. World development at the 
present stage is characterized 
by the strengthening of global 
competition, tensions in 
various areas of inter-state and 
interregional interaction, 
The current 
geopolitical 
paradigm is chaotic 
and filled with 
competing interests 
and instability due 
Chaotic Ecosystem 
 
Multipolar World 
Interstate Tension 
Y Viewpoint 
100 
 
rivalry of proclaimed values 
and models of development, 
instability of the processes of 
economic and political 
development at the global and 
regional levels against a 
background of general 
complication of international 
relations. There is a stage-by-
stage redistribution of 
influence in favour of new 
centres of economic growth 
and political attraction 
to a wide variety of 
inequality and 
socioeconomic 
factors. 
2014R 11. ...The existing international 
security architecture (system) 
does not ensure equal security 
for all states. 
Russia has a 
dissatisfaction with 
the current system. 
Dissatisfaction: Status-
Quo 
Y Viewpoint 
2014R 12a. ...build-up of the power 
potential of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) 
and vesting NATO with global 
functions carried out in 
violation of the rules of 
international law, bringing the 
military infrastructure of 
NATO member countries near 
the borders of the Russian 
Federation, including by 
further expansion of the 
alliance 
Russia views 
NATO as violating 
international law 
via expansion. 
Threat Perception 
 
International Law 
Y Viewpoint 
2014R 12d. ...establishment and 
deployment of strategic missile 
defense systems undermining 
global stability and violating 
the established balance of 
forces related to nuclear 
missiles, implementation of the 
Russia defines the 
status-quo and says 
that NATO 
violated it by 
several methods. 
Definition: Status-quo 
 
Balance of Power 
 
Threat Perception 
Y Viewpoint 
101 
 
global strike concept, intention 
to place weapons in outer 
space, as well as deployment of 
strategic non-nuclear systems 
of high-precision weapons 
2014R 12l.use of information and 
communication technologies 
for the military-political 
purposes to take actions which 
run counter to international 
law, being aimed against 
sovereignty, political 
independence, territorial 
integrity of states and posing 
threat to the international 
peace, security, global and 
regional stability 
Cyber-enabled 
assets can be used 
to undermine the 
integrity of state 
sovereignty. 
Cyber: Sovereignty 
violations [Negative 
Connotation] 
Y Precept 
2014R 22. The Russian Federation has 
the legitimate right to employ 
the Armed Forces, other troops 
and bodies to repel aggression 
against itself and/or its allies, 
to maintain (restore) peace as 
decided by the UN Security 
Council or another collective 
security body, as well as to 
protect its citizens abroad in 
accordance with generally 
recognized principles and 
norms of international law and 
international treaties of the 
Russian Federation. 
Russia has the right 
to protect its 
citizens abroad, 
and enact security 
measures in line 
with international 
norms, law, UNSC 
mandate. 
Protect Citizens 
Abroad 
 
International Norms 
 
International Law 
 
UNSC 
Y Precept 
 
 
2014R 31. The Armed Forces of the 
Russian Federation may be 
employed outside the country 
to protect the interests of the 
Russian Federation and its 
Russia may protect 
its citizens abroad 
and protect 
interests, in 
accordance with 
Protect Citizens 
Abroad 
 
Protect Interests 
Y Precept 
102 
 
citizens and to maintain 
international peace and security 
in accordance with the 
generally recognized principles 
and norms of international law, 
international treaties of the 
Russian Federation and the 
federal legislation. 
international 
norms, laws, and 
treaties. 
 
International Norms 
 
International Treaties 
 
International Law 
2014R 32s. to protect national 
interests of the Russian 
Federation in the Arctic region. 
Russia prioritizes 
the Arctic. 
Arctic Y AoI: Arctic 
2014R 55b.with the Republic of 
Abkhazia and the Republic of 
South Ossetia – ensuring 
common defense and security 
Russia has 
Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia 
under its extended 
deterrence 
umbrella. 
Abkhazia 
 
South Ossetia 
 
Common Defense 
Y AoI: Abkhazia 
& South 
Ossetia 
2014R 55a) to strengthen international 
security and strategic stability 
at global and regional levels on 
the basis of the rule of 
international law, and first of 
all the UN Charter provisions; 
Russia follows a 
rules-based order 
under international 
law and the UN 
charter. 
International Law 
 
UN 
Y Precept 
 
AoI: 
International 
Treaties 
2014R 55b) to establish and develop 
allied relations with the 
member states of the CSTO 
and the member states of the 
CIS, with the Republic of 
Abkhazia and the Republic of 
South Ossetia, as well as 
relations of friendship and 
partnership with other states; 
Russia desires to 
ally with the 
CSTO, CIS, 
Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, and other 
states. 
Abkhazia 
 
South Ossetia 
 
Allies 
Y AoI: Abkhazia 
& South 
Ossetia 
2014R 55d) to develop relations with 
international organizations for 
the prevention of conflict 
situations and maintenance and 
Russia desires to 
work with 
international 
Conflict Resolution 
 
Y Precept 
103 
 
strengthening of peace in 
various regions, including with 
the participation of Russian 
military contingents in 
peacekeeping operations 
organizations for 
conflict resolution. 
International 
Organization 
2014R 55e) to maintain equitable 
relations with interested states 
and international organizations 
to counter the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction 
and their means of delivery; 
Russia desires to 
cooperate 
internationally for 
weapons control. 
Weapons proliferation  
 
Missiles 
N  
2014R 55g) to fulfill international 
obligations of the Russian 
Federation. 
Russia has a duty 
to fulfill 
international 
obligations. 
International Norms 
 
International Treaties 
Y Precept 
2014R 56a) with the Republic of 
Belarus: 
-coordinating the activities in 
the sphere of development of 
the national Armed Forces and 
the use of the military 
infrastructure; 
-elaborating and harmonizing 
measures to maintain the 
defense capability of the Union 
State [of Russia and Belarus] in 
accordance with the Military 
Doctrine of the Union State; 
Russia desires for 
better coordination 
and interoperability 
with Belarus. 
Belarus 
 
Coordination 
 
Elaboration 
N N/A 
2014R 56b) with the Republic of 
Abkhazia and the Republic of 
South Ossetia – ensuring 
common defense and security; 
Russia has 
Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia 
under its extended 
deterrence 
Abkhazia 
 
South Ossetia 
 
Common Defense 
Y AoI: Abkhazia 
& South 
Ossetia 
104 
 
2014R 56c) with the CSTO member 
states – consolidating efforts to 
improve the capabilities of the 
CSTO collective security 
system for ensuring collective 
security and common defense; 
Russia works with 
CSTO with 
upgrading defense. 
CSTO 
 
Consolidation 
 
Capabilities 
N N/A 
2014R 56d) with the CIS member 
states – ensuring regional and 
international security and 
carrying out peacekeeping 
operations; 
Russia uses 
peacekeeping 
operations with 
CIS members. 
CIS 
 
Security 
 
Peacekeeping 
N N/A 
2014R 56e) with the SCO states – 
coordinating efforts to confront 
new military risks and military 
threats within common space, 
as well as establishing a 
necessary legal and regulatory 
framework; 
Russia coordinates 
military legal 
efforts with SCO. 
SCO 
 
Coordination 
N N/A 
2014R 56f) with the United Nations 
and other international, 
including regional, 
organizations – involving 
representatives of the Armed 
Forces, other troops and bodies 
in the management of 
peacekeeping operations and in 
the process of planning and 
carrying out preparatory 
activities for operations aimed 
at maintaining (restoring) 
peace, as well as in 
participating in the elaboration, 
coordination, and 
implementation of international 
agreements on arms control 
Russia works with 
the 
UN/International 
organizations with 
international 
treaties, arms 
control, and 
peacekeeping. 
UN  
 
International 
Organization 
 
International Treaties 
 
Arms Control 
 
 
Y Precept 
 
AoI: 
International 
Treaties 
105 
 
and strengthening international 
security and increasing the 
participation of units and 
servicemen of the Armed 
Forces, other troops and bodies 
in operations aimed at 
maintaining (restoring) peace. 
2015R 7. State policy in the sphere of 
the safeguarding of national 
security and the socioeconomic 
development of the Russian 
Federation contributes to the 
implementation of the strategic 
national priorities and the 
effective protection of national 
interests. A solid basis has 
been created at this time for 
further increasing the Russian 
Federation's economic, 
political, military, and spiritual 
potentials and for enhancing its 
role in shaping a polycentric 
world 
Russia views itself 
in a polycentric 
paradigm and is 
working towards 
improving its 
actorship. 
Polycentric World 
 
Actorship 
 
 
Y Precept 
2015R 8. Russia has demonstrated the 
ability to safeguard 
sovereignty, independence, and 
state and territorial integrity 
and to protect the rights of 
compatriots abroad. There has 
been an increase in the Russian 
Federation's role in resolving 
the most important 
international problems, settling 
military conflicts, and ensuring 
strategic stability and the 
supremacy of international law 
in interstate relations. 
Russia protects 
compatriots abroad 
and desires the 
supremacy of 
international law. 
Compatriots abroad 
 
Supremacy of 
International Law 
Y Precept 
106 
 
2015R 12. The strengthening of 
Russia is taking place against a 
backdrop of new threats to 
national security that are of a 
multifarious and 
interconnected nature. The 
Russian Federation's 
implementation of an 
independent foreign and 
domestic policy is giving rise 
to opposition from the United 
States and its allies, who are 
seeking to retain their 
dominance in world affairs. 
The policy of containing 
Russia that they are 
implementing envisions the 
exertion of political, economic, 
military, and informational 
pressure on it. 
There are multiple 
threats to Russia, 
including 
opposition from the 
US and its allies, 
who dominate the 
current world and 
are trying to 
contain Russia. 
Threat Perception 
 
Revisionism 
 
Containment: Russia 
 
Threat Perception 
Y Viewpoint 
2015R 13. The process of shaping a 
new polycentric model of the 
world order is being 
accompanied by an increase in 
global and regional instability. 
We are seeing an exacerbation 
of contradictions linked to the 
unevenness of world 
development, the deepening of 
the gap between countries' 
levels of prosperity, the 
struggle for resources, access 
to markets, and control over 
transportation arteries. The 
competition between states is 
increasingly encompassing 
social development values and 
models and human, scientific, 
Russia is shaping a 
new polycentric 
world order, which 
causes 
global/regional 
instability. There 
are widening gaps 
of inequality and 
competition. 
Waterways are an 
important 
dimension. The 
special services are 
increasingly 
important as a tool 
for deterrence. 
Revisionism 
 
Threat Perception 
 
Competition 
 
Arctic 
 
Special Services 
 
Sea 
 
Spectrum: struggles 
Y Viewpoint 
 
Precepts 
 
AoI: Arctic 
 
AoI: Special 
Services 
 
AoI: Sea 
107 
 
and technological potentials. 
Leadership in exploiting the 
resources of the world's oceans 
and the Arctic is acquiring 
particular significance in this 
process. An entire spectrum of 
political, financial-economic, 
and informational instruments 
have been set in motion in the 
struggle for influence in the 
international arena. 
Increasingly active use is being 
made of special services' 
potential. 
2015R 15. The buildup of the military 
potential of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) 
and the endowment of it with 
global functions pursued in 
violation of the norms of 
international law, the 
galvanization of the bloc 
countries' military activity, the 
further expansion of the 
alliance, and the location of its 
military infrastructure closer to 
Russian borders are creating a 
threat to national security. The 
opportunities for maintaining 
global and regional stability are 
shrinking significantly with the 
siting in Europe, the Asia-
Pacific region, and the Near 
East of components of the US 
missile defense system in the 
conditions of the practical 
implementation of the "global 
strike" concept and the 
NATO is violating 
international law 
with its actions and 
capability 
developments, 
which threatens 
Russia. 
Threat Perception 
 
International Law 
 
 
Y Viewpoint 
 
108 
 
deployment of strategic 
nonnuclear precision weapon 
systems and also in the event 
that weapons are deployed in 
space. 
2015R 16. The persisting bloc 
approach to solving 
international problems is not 
helping to counter the entire 
range of present-day challenges 
and threats. The increase in 
migration flows from African 
and Near Eastern countries to 
Europe has demonstrated the 
non-viability of the regional 
security system in the Euro-
Atlantic Region based on 
NATO and the European 
Union. 
Bloc approaches in 
general threaten 
stability. 
Threat Perception Y Viewpoint 
2015R 17. The West's stance aimed at 
countering integration 
processes and creating seats of 
tension in the Eurasian region 
is exerting a negative influence 
on the realization of Russian 
national interests. The support 
of the United States and the 
European Union for the anti-
constitutional coup d'etat in 
Ukraine led to a deep split in 
Ukrainian society and the 
emergence of an armed 
conflict. The strengthening of 
far right nationalist ideology, 
the deliberate shaping in the 
Ukrainian population of an 
image of Russia as an enemy, 
The West is 
creating tension 
and countering 
Russian Interests. 
The US and EU 
support an illegal 
coup in Ukraine, 
and are responsible 
for the current 
situation. They are 
blaming Russia for 
the Ukrainian 
crisis. 
Threat Perception 
 
Ukraine 
 
Conflict 
 
Threat Perception 
 
Threat Perception 
 
Threat Perception 
Y Viewpoint 
 
AoI: Ukraine 
109 
 
the undisguised gamble on the 
forcible resolution of intrastate 
contradictions, and the deep 
socioeconomic crisis are 
turning Ukraine into a chronic 
seat of instability in Europe 
and in the immediate vicinity 
of Russia's borders. 
2015R -- consolidating the Russian 
Federation's status as a leading 
world power, whose actions are 
aimed at maintaining strategic 
stability and mutually 
beneficial partnerships in a 
polycentric world. 
Russia is 
consolidating its 
great power role, in 
a polycentric 
world. 
Polycentric World 
 
Russia great power 
Y Viewpoint 
2015R 29. In the sphere of 
international security Russia 
remains committed to the 
utilization of primarily political 
and legal instruments and 
diplomatic and peacekeeping 
mechanisms. The utilization of 
military force to protect 
national interests is possible 
only if all adopted measures of 
a nonviolent nature have 
proved ineffective. 
The military will 
be used as a last 
resort.  
Military Last Report 
 
Diplomacy 
Y Precept 
2015R 36. Interrelated political, 
military, military-technical, 
diplomatic, economic, 
informational, and other 
measures are being developed 
and implemented in order to 
ensure strategic deterrence and 
the prevention of armed 
conflicts. These measures are 
intended to prevent the use of 
Strategic and 
Nuclear Deterrence 
definition. 
Strategic Deterrence 
 
Nuclear Deterrence 
Y Precept 
110 
 
armed force against Russia, 
and to protect its sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. 
Strategic deterrence and the 
prevention of armed conflicts 
are achieved by maintaining 
the capacity for nuclear 
deterrence at a sufficient level, 
and the Russian Federation 
Armed Forces, other troops, 
and military formations and 
bodies at the requisite level of 
combat readiness. 
2015R 43. The main threats to state 
and public security are: -- 
intelligence and other activity 
by special services and 
organizations of foreign states 
and individuals that causes 
harm to national interests; -- 
the activities of terrorist and 
extremist organizations aimed 
at changing the constitutional 
order of the Russian Federation 
through violence, disrupting 
the operation of the organs of 
state power, destroying or 
disrupting the functioning of 
military and industrial 
facilities, critical public 
infrastructure, and transport 
infrastructure, and intimidating 
the population, including by 
the acquisition of weapons of 
mass destruction, and 
radioactive, poisonous, toxic, 
and chemically and 
biologically dangerous 
Multitude of threat 
perceptions 
including special 
services, foreign 
operators, non-state 
actors, and a whole 
host of WMD 
attacks, critical 
infrastructure, etc. 
Threat perception 
 
Threat Perception 
 
Threat Perception 
 
Threat Perception 
 
Color revolution 
 
Threat Perception 
Y Viewpoint 
111 
 
substances, carrying out 
nuclear terrorist attacks, and 
attacking and disrupting the 
continuous operation of the 
Russian Federation's vital IT 
infrastructure; -- the activities 
of radical public associations 
and groups using nationalist 
and religious extremist 
ideology, foreign and 
international nongovernmental 
organizations, and financial 
and economic structures, and 
also individuals, focused on 
destroying the unity and 
territorial integrity of the 
Russian Federation, 
destabilizing the domestic 
political and social situation -- 
including through inciting 
"color revolutions" -- and 
destroying traditional Russian 
religious and moral values; -- 
the activities of criminal 
organizations and groups, 
including transnational ones, 
connected with the illegal trade 
in narcotic and psychotropic 
substances, weapons, 
ammunition, explosives, and 
the organization of illegal 
migration and human 
trafficking; -- activities 
connected with the use of 
information and 
communication technologies to 
disseminate and promote the 
ideology of fascism, 
112 
 
extremism, terrorism, and 
separatism, and to endanger the 
civil peace and political and 
social stability in society; -- 
criminal offenses targeting 
individuals, property, the state 
authorities, and public and 
economic security; -- 
corruption; -- natural disasters, 
accidents, and catastrophes, 
including those connected with 
global climate change, the 
deterioration of the physical 
condition of infrastructure, and 
outbreaks of fire. 
2015R 76. The strategic aims of 
ensuring national security in 
the sphere of culture are: -- the 
preservation and augmentation 
of traditional Russian spiritual 
and moral values as the 
foundation of Russian society, 
and the education of children 
and young people in a civic 
spirit; -- the preservation and 
development of the common 
Russian identity of the Russian 
Federation’s peoples and of the 
country’s unified cultural area; 
-- the enhancement of Russia’s 
role in the world humanitarian 
and cultural area. 
Russian spiritual, 
moral and cultural 
values are the 
foundation of 
society. 
Spiritual Values 
 
Moral Values 
 
Culture 
N N/A 
2015R 87. The safeguarding of 
national interests is furthered 
by an active Russian 
Federation foreign policy 
geared to creating a stable and 
National interest in 
making a new 
international 
system relying on 
international law, 
International Law 
 
Norm creation 
 
Y Precept 
113 
 
enduring system of 
international relations relying 
on international law and based 
on the principles of equality, 
mutual respect, noninterference 
in states' internal affairs, 
mutually beneficial 
cooperation, and a political 
settlement of global and 
regional crisis situations. 
equality, and 
noninterference. 
System creation 
2015R 89. The development of 
relations of bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation with 
the members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent 
States, the Republic of 
Abkhazia, and the Republic of 
South Ossetia is for the 
Russian Federation a key area 
of foreign policy. Russia is 
developing the potential of 
regional and sub regional 
integration and coordination on 
the territory of the participants 
in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States within the 
Commonwealth itself and also 
the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization , the Eurasian 
Economic Union, and the 
Union State exerting a 
stabilizing influence on the 
general situation in the regions 
bordering the participants in 
the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, the 
The CIS, 
Abkhazia, and 
South Ossetia will 
be regionally 
integrated, and 
other regional 
organizations will 
have relations 
developed. 
CIS 
 
Abkhazia 
 
South Ossetia 
 
CSTO 
 
EEU 
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Republic of Abkhazia, and the 
Republic of South Ossetia. 
2015R 98. The Russian Federation is 
interested in establishing full-
fledged partnership with the 
United States of America on 
the basis of coincident 
interests, in the economic 
sphere included, and with 
regard to the key influence of 
Russo-American relations on 
the state of the international 
situation as a whole. The 
improvement of the 
mechanisms of arms control 
specified by international 
treaties, confidence-building 
measures, the solution of 
questions involving the 
nonproliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, expanded 
cooperation in the fight against 
terrorism, and the settlement of 
regional conflicts remain most 
important areas of this 
partnership. 
Russia desires to 
work with the US 
on a variety of 
efforts such as 
arms control, 
conflict resolution, 
and other existing 
treaty obligations. 
International Treaties 
 
Arms Control 
 
Conflict Resolution 
Y AoI: 
International 
Treaties 
2015R 104. To preserve strategic 
stability the Russian 
Federation: -- contributes to the 
preservation of the stability of 
the system of international law 
and the prevention of its 
fragmentation, attenuation, and 
selective application resulting 
in instability and conflicts; -- 
honors international treaties 
and agreements in effect in the 
Russia prioritizes 
international law 
and treaties, equal 
application: 
especially with 
arms control, 
nuclear weapons, 
etc; in accordance 
with international 
law and the UN. 
International Law 
 
Threat Perception 
 
International Treaties 
 
Arms control 
 
UN 
Y Precept 
 
AoI: 
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sphere of arms limitation and 
reduction and participates in 
the drafting and conclusion of 
new accords corresponding to 
national interests; -- is prepared 
for further discussion of a 
reduction of nuclear potentials 
based on bilateral accords and 
in multilateral formats and also 
contributes to the creation of 
fitting conditions permitting a 
reduction in nuclear arms 
without detriment to 
international security and 
strategic stability; -- 
contributes to the strengthening 
of regional stability through 
participation in processes of a 
reduction and limitation of 
conventional armed forces, and 
also through the development 
and application of confidence-
building measures in the 
military sphere; -- considers 
international peacekeeping an 
effective instrument for settling 
armed conflicts, and 
participates in it and advocates 
the strengthening of this 
institution strictly in 
accordance with the principles 
of the United Nations Charter; 
-- contributes to the formation 
of a system of international 
information security; -- 
participates in activities 
pursued under the aegis of the 
United Nations and other 
 
International Law 
 
International 
Organization 
 
Conflict Resolution 
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international organizations to 
deal with natural and manmade 
disasters and other 
emergencies, and also in 
rendering humanitarian aid to 
countries affected. 
2015R 105. To ensure strategic 
stability and equal multilateral 
cooperation in the international 
arena the Russian Federation 
makes every necessary effort to 
maintain at the least costly 
level deterrence potential in the 
sphere of strategic offensive 
arms. 
Russia attempts to 
prevent escalation 
with the lowest 
level of deterrence. 
Deterrence 
 
Reassurance 
 
Nuclear Deterrence 
Y Precept 
2015R 115. The main indicators 
necessary for an evaluation of 
the state of national security 
are: -- the citizens' degree of 
satisfaction with the protection 
of their constitutional rights 
and freedoms and personal and 
property interests, including 
against criminal infringements; 
-- the proportion of modern 
models of arms and military 
and special equipment in the 
Russian Federation Armed 
Forces, other troops, and 
military formations and organs; 
-- life expectancy; -- per capita 
GDP; -- decile coefficient 
(ratio of the income of the most 
prosperous 10 percent of the 
population and the least 
prosperous 10 percent of the 
population); -- inflation; -- 
Russian indicators 
for state security 
are internal 
measures of 
welfare. 
Indicators 
 
National Security 
 
Internal 
N Precept 
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unemployment; -- proportion 
of expenditure in the GDP on 
the development of science, 
technology, and education; -- 
proportion of expenditure in 
the GDP on culture; -- 
proportion of territory of the 
Russian Federation not 
conforming to environmental 
standards. 
2009R 6b) in the sphere of military 
security, defense and 
protection of the state border of 
the Russian Federation lying in 
the Arctic zone of the Russian 
Federation - maintenance of a 
favorable operative regime in 
the Arctic zone of the Russian 
Federation, including 
maintenance of a necessary 
fighting potential of groupings 
of general purpose armies 
(forces) of the Armed Forces of 
the Russian Federation, other 
armies, military formations and 
organs in this region 
The Arctic is 
important for 
national defense. 
Arctic 
 
Paradigm setting 
Y Precept 
2009R b) in the sphere of military 
security, defense and 
protection of the state border of 
the Russian Federation lying in 
the Arctic zone of the Russian 
Federation, it is necessary: 
-to create groupings of armies 
(forces) of the general purpose 
of the Armed Forces of the 
Russian Federation, other 
armies, military formations and 
The Arctic is 
important to 
Russia, and 
requires a new 
border regime, 
capable of exerting 
control over the 
vast area; and an 
entirely new 
system and 
infrastructure. 
Arctic 
 
Paradigm setting 
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Y Precept 
118 
 
organs (first of all, boundary 
organs) in the Arctic zone of 
the Russian Federation, 
capable to provide military 
security under various 
conditions of a military-
political situation; 
-to optimize the system of a 
complex control over the 
situation in the Arctic, 
including the boundary control 
at the check points across the 
state border of the Russian 
Federation, introduction of a 
border zones regime in the 
administrative-territorial 
formations of the Arctic zone 
of the Russian Federation and 
the organization of a device 
technical control over the strait 
zones, rivers estuaries, firths on 
the itinerary of the Northern 
Sea Route; 
-to bring the possibilities of the 
boundary organs into line with 
the character of threats and 
challenges of the Russian 
Federation in the Arctic. 
-The basic measures on the 
realization of the state policy in 
the sphere of military security, 
defense and protection of the 
state border of the Russian 
Federation lying in the Arctic 
zone of the Russian Federation, 
are as follows: 
System creation 
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-creation of an actively 
functioning system of the coast 
guard of the Federal security 
service of the Russian 
Federation in the Arctic zone 
of the Russian Federation and 
increase of efficiency of 
interaction with boundary 
departments (coast guards) of 
the adjacent states concerning 
combating terrorism on the sea, 
suppression of illicit activity, 
illegal migration, protection of 
water biological resources; 
-development of a boundary 
infrastructure of the Arctic 
zone of the Russian Federation 
and technical reequipment of 
boundary organs; 
-creation of a system of the 
complex control over the 
surface situation, strengthening 
of the state control over trade 
activity in the Arctic zone of 
the Russian Federation; 
2015C -The world today is undergoing 
unprecedented changes, and 
China is at a critical stage of 
reform and development. In 
their endeavor to realize the 
Chinese Dream of great 
national rejuvenation, the 
Chinese people aspire to join 
hands with the rest of the world 
to maintain peace, pursue 
development and share 
prosperity. 
The world is 
changing, China 
desires to 
peacefully develop 
and opposes 
hegemony and 
power politics. 
Paradigm setting 
Status-quo 
 
Peace 
 
Stability 
 
Opposition: 
Hegemonism 
Y Viewpoint 
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-China’s destiny is vitally 
interrelated with that of the 
world as a whole. A prosperous 
and stable world would provide 
China with opportunities, while 
China’s peaceful development 
also offers an opportunity for 
the whole world. China will 
unswervingly follow the path 
of peaceful development, 
pursue an independent foreign 
policy of peace and a national 
defense policy that is defensive 
in nature, oppose hegemonism 
and power politics in all forms, 
and will never seek hegemony 
or expansion. China’s armed 
forces will remain a staunch 
force in maintaining world 
peace. 
 
Opposition: Power 
Politics 
 
Peace 
2015C -In today’s world, the global 
trends toward multi-polarity 
and economic globalization are 
intensifying, and an 
information society is rapidly 
coming into being. Countries 
are increasingly bound together 
in a community of shared 
destiny. Peace, development, 
cooperation and mutual benefit 
have become an irresistible tide 
of the times. 
-Profound changes are taking 
place in the international 
situation, as manifested in the 
historic changes in the balance 
of power, global governance 
There is a global 
trend towards 
multipolarity and 
interconnection. 
There are changes 
happening both 
locally and abroad, 
in regards to 
international 
competition and 
towards peace. 
There are a variety 
of threats that 
threaten this 
development. 
Paradigm setting 
 
Multipolar world 
 
Peace 
 
Interconnectedness 
 
Changing paradigm 
 
Balance of power 
 
Peace 
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structure, Asia-Pacific 
geostrategic landscape, and 
international competition in the 
economic, scientific and 
technological, and military 
fields. The forces for world 
peace are on the rise, so are the 
factors against war. In the 
foreseeable future, a world war 
is unlikely, and the 
international situation is 
expected to remain generally 
peaceful. There are, however, 
new threats from hegemonism, 
power politics and neo-
interventionism. International 
competition for the 
redistribution of power, rights 
and interests is tending to 
intensify. Terrorist activities 
are growing increasingly 
worrisome. Hotspot issues, 
such as ethnic, religious, 
border and territorial disputes, 
are complex and volatile. 
Small-scale wars, conflicts and 
crises are recurrent in some 
regions. Therefore, the world 
still faces both immediate and 
potential threats of local wars. 
 
Threat perception 
 
Interventionism 
 
 
2015C -With a generally favorable 
external environment, China 
will remain in an important 
period of strategic 
opportunities for its 
development, a period in which 
much can be achieved. China’s 
comprehensive national 
China is growing in 
international 
influence and 
capability and 
faces threats to its 
national 
unification, 
territorial integrity, 
Threat Perception 
 
National Unification 
 
Territorial Integrity 
 
Y Viewpoint 
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strength, core competitiveness 
and risk-resistance capacity are 
notably increasing, and China 
enjoys growing international 
standing and influence. 
Domestically, the Chinese 
people’s standard of living has 
remarkably improved, and 
Chinese society remains stable. 
China, as a large developing 
country, still faces multiple and 
complex security threats, as 
well as increasing external 
impediments and challenges. 
Subsistence and development 
security concerns, as well as 
traditional and non-traditional 
security threats are interwoven. 
Therefore, China has an 
arduous task to safeguard its 
national unification, territorial 
integrity and development 
interests. 
and developmental 
interests. 
Development Interests AoI: 
Territorial 
Integrity 
 
AoI: 
Development/ 
Overseas 
Interests 
2015C -As the world economic and 
strategic center of gravity is 
shifting ever more rapidly to 
the Asia-Pacific region, the US 
carries on its “rebalancing” 
strategy and enhances its 
military presence and its 
military alliances in this region. 
Japan is sparing no effort to 
dodge the post-war 
mechanism, overhauling its 
military and security policies. 
Such development has caused 
grave concerns among other 
countries in the region. On the 
Asia is becoming 
more important, the 
US is reasserting 
itself, Japan is 
remilitarizing. 
China has 
important maritime 
rights and 
territorial interests 
which are getting 
infringed upon. 
Instability in the 
Korean peninsula 
Paradigm shift 
 
Threat perception 
 
Territorial sovereignty 
 
Maritime rights and 
interests 
 
Island occupation 
 
Y Viewpoint 
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Rights and 
Interests 
 
AoI: Korean 
Peninsula 
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issues concerning China’s 
territorial sovereignty and 
maritime rights and interests, 
some of its offshore neighbors 
take provocative actions and 
reinforce their military 
presence on China’s reefs and 
islands that they have illegally 
occupied. Some external 
countries are also busy 
meddling in South China Sea 
affairs; a tiny few maintain 
constant close-in air and sea 
surveillance and 
reconnaissance against China. 
It is thus a long-standing task 
for China to safeguard its 
maritime rights and interests. 
Certain disputes over land 
territory are still smoldering. 
The Korean Peninsula and 
Northeast Asia are shrouded in 
instability and uncertainty. 
Regional terrorism, separatism 
and extremism are rampant. All 
these have a negative impact 
on the security and stability 
along China’s periphery. 
and separatism are 
threats. 
South China Sea 
 
External influence 
 
Maritime Rights and 
Interests 
 
Korean Peninsula 
 
Instability 
 
Separatism 
 
 
2015C -The Taiwan issue bears on 
China’s reunification and long-
term development, and 
reunification is an inevitable 
trend in the course of national 
rejuvenation. In recent years, 
cross-Taiwan Straits relations 
have sustained a sound 
momentum of peaceful 
development, but the root 
Taiwan 
reunification is 
inevitable. 
Separatists are 
threatening 
peaceful 
development. 
There are other 
internal separatism 
movements and 
Taiwan 
 
National Unificaion 
 
Inevitable 
 
Peaceful 
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cause of instability has not yet 
been removed, and the 
“Taiwan independence” 
separatist forces and their 
activities are still the biggest 
threat to the peaceful 
development of cross-Straits 
relations. Further, China faces 
a formidable task to maintain 
political security and social 
stability. Separatist forces for 
“East Turkistan independence” 
and “Tibet independence” have 
inflicted serious damage, 
particularly with escalating 
violent terrorist activities by 
“East Turkistan independence” 
forces. Besides, anti-China 
forces have never given up 
their attempt to instigate a 
“color revolution” in this 
country. Consequently, China 
faces more challenges in terms 
of national security and social 
stability. With the growth of 
China’s national interests, its 
national security is more 
vulnerable to international and 
regional turmoil, terrorism, 
piracy, serious natural disasters 
and epidemics, and the security 
of overseas interests 
concerning energy and 
resources, strategic sea lines of 
communication (SLOCs), as 
well as institutions, personnel 
and assets abroad, has become 
an imminent issue. 
threat of a color 
revolution. 
 
Instability 
 
Separatism 
 
Color Revolution 
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2015C -To realize China’s national 
strategic goal and implement 
the holistic view of national 
security, new requirements 
have been raised for innovative 
development of China’s 
military strategy and the 
accomplishment of military 
missions and tasks. In response 
to the new requirement of 
safeguarding national security 
and development interests, 
China’s armed forces will work 
harder to create a favorable 
strategic posture with more 
emphasis on the employment 
of military forces and means, 
and provide a solid security 
guarantee for the country’s 
peaceful development. In 
response to the new 
requirement arising from the 
changing security situation, the 
armed forces will constantly 
innovate strategic guidance and 
operational thoughts so as to 
ensure the capabilities of 
fighting and winning. In 
response to the new 
requirement arising from the 
worldwide RMA, the armed 
forces will pay close attention 
to the challenges in new 
security domains, and work 
hard to seize the strategic 
initiative in military 
competition. In response to the 
new requirement coming from 
China needs to 
improve the 
systems and 
strategies of its 
armed forces to 
accomplish its 
national security 
objectives to 
safeguard its 
national, 
developmental, and 
overseas interests, 
reunify the state, 
and provide for 
regional stability. 
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the country’s growing strategic 
interests, the armed forces will 
actively participate in both 
regional and international 
security cooperation and 
effectively secure China’s 
overseas interests. And in 
response to the new 
requirement arising from 
China’s all-round and 
deepening reform, the armed 
forces will continue to follow 
the path of civil-military 
integration (CMI), actively 
participate in the country’s 
economic and social 
construction, and firmly 
maintain social stability, so as 
to remain a staunch force for 
upholding the CPC’s ruling 
position and a reliable force for 
developing socialism with 
Chinese characteristics. 
-China’s armed forces mainly 
shoulder the following strategic 
tasks: 
--- To deal with a wide range 
of emergencies and military 
threats, and effectively 
safeguard the sovereignty and 
security of China’s territorial 
land, air and sea; 
--- To resolutely safeguard the 
unification of the motherland; 
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--- To safeguard China’s 
security and interests in new 
domains; 
--- To safeguard the security of 
China’s overseas interests; 
--- To maintain strategic 
deterrence and carry out 
nuclear counterattack; 
--- To participate in regional 
and international security 
cooperation and maintain 
regional and world peace; 
--- To perform such tasks as 
emergency rescue and disaster 
relief, rights and interests 
protection, guard duties, and 
support for national economic 
and social development. 
2015C -III. Strategic Guideline of 
Active Defense 
-The strategic concept of active 
defense is the essence of the 
CPC’s military strategic 
thought. From the long-term 
practice of revolutionary wars, 
the people’s armed forces have 
developed a complete set of 
strategic concepts of active 
defense, which boils down to: 
adherence to the unity of 
strategic defense and 
operational and tactical 
offense; adherence to the 
principles of defense, self-
defense and post-emptive 
strike; and adherence to the 
Active defense is 
an important 
concept and is 
defined here. If we 
are attacked we 
must attack back. 
Strategic concepts 
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stance that “We will not attack 
unless we are attacked, but we 
will surely counterattack if 
attacked.” 
2015C -China’s socialist nature, 
fundamental national interests 
and the objective requirement 
of taking the path of peaceful 
development all demand that 
China unswervingly adhere to 
and enrich the strategic concept 
of active defense. Guided by 
national security and 
development strategies, and 
required by the situation and 
their tasks in the new historical 
period, China’s armed forces 
will continue to implement the 
military strategic guideline of 
active defense and enhance 
military strategic guidance as 
the times so require. They will 
further broaden strategic 
vision, update strategic 
thinking and make strategic 
guidance more forward-
looking. A holistic approach 
will be taken to balance war 
preparation and war 
prevention, rights protection 
and stability maintenance, 
deterrence and warfighting, 
and operations in wartime and 
employment of military forces 
in peacetime. They will lay 
stress on farsighted planning 
and management to create a 
favorable posture, 
China desires 
peaceful 
development and 
uses active defense. 
It will attempt to 
continue to develop 
measures to 
enhance military 
readiness and 
contribute to 
regional stability. 
Peace 
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comprehensively manage 
crises, and resolutely deter and 
win wars. 
2015C -To implement the military 
strategic guideline of active 
defense in the new situation, 
China’s armed forces will 
optimize the military strategic 
layout. In view of China’s 
geostrategic environment, the 
security threats it faces and the 
strategic tasks they shoulder, 
the armed forces will make 
overall planning for strategic 
deployment and military 
disposition, in order to clearly 
divide areas of responsibility 
for their troops, and enable 
them to support each other and 
act as an organic whole. 
Threats from such new security 
domains as outer space and 
cyber space will be dealt with 
to maintain the common 
security of the world 
community. China’s armed 
forces will strengthen 
international security 
cooperation in areas crucially 
related to China’s overseas 
interests, to ensure the security 
of such interests. 
China uses active 
defense, and 
prioritizes 
international 
cooperation for its 
overseas interests. 
It also prioritizes 
outer space and 
cyberspace as 
important security 
domains. 
Active Defense 
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2015C -To implement the military 
strategic guideline of active 
defense in the new situation, 
China’s armed forces will 
China’s military 
will follow the 
guidelines set out 
in previous legal 
subordinate 
Territorial Sovereignty 
 
Maritime Rights and 
Interests 
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uphold the following 
principles: 
--- To be subordinate to and in 
the service of the national 
strategic goal, implement the 
holistic view of national 
security, strengthen PMS, 
prevent crises, deter and win 
wars; 
--- To foster a strategic posture 
favorable to China’s peaceful 
development, adhere to the 
national defense policy that is 
defensive in nature, persevere 
in close coordination of 
political, military, economic 
and diplomatic work, and 
positively cope with 
comprehensive security threats 
the country possibly 
encounters; 
--- To strike a balance between 
rights protection and stability 
maintenance, and make overall 
planning for both, safeguard 
national territorial sovereignty 
and maritime rights and 
interests, and maintain security 
and stability along China’s 
periphery; 
--- To endeavor to seize the 
strategic initiative in military 
struggle, proactively plan for 
military struggle in all 
directions and domains, and 
grasp the opportunities to 
documentation. 
The military will 
be defensive and 
adaptable for the 
pursuit of regional 
stability, territorial 
sovereignty, and 
maintain border 
security as well as 
maritime rights and 
interests. It will 
also seek to 
improve itself 
competitively and 
strategically, while 
attempting to 
cooperate 
regionally in 
security. 
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accelerate military building, 
reform and development; 
--- To employ strategies and 
tactics featuring flexibility and 
mobility, give full play to the 
overall effectiveness of joint 
operations, concentrate 
superior forces, and make 
integrated use of all operational 
means and methods; 
--- To make serious 
preparations to cope with the 
most complex and difficult 
scenarios, uphold bottom-line 
thinking, and do a solid job in 
all aspects so as to ensure 
proper responses to such 
scenarios with ease at any time 
and in any circumstances; 
--- To bring into full play the 
unique political advantages of 
the people’s armed forces, 
uphold the CPC’s absolute 
leadership over the military, 
accentuate the cultivation of 
fighting spirit, enforce strict 
discipline, improve the 
professionalism and strength of 
the troops, build closer 
relations between the 
government and the military as 
well as between the people and 
the military, and boost the 
morale of officers and men; 
--- To give full play to the 
overall power of the concept of 
people’s war, persist in 
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employing it as an ace weapon 
to triumph over the enemy, 
enrich the contents, ways and 
means of the concept of 
people’s war, and press 
forward with the shift of the 
focus of war mobilization from 
human resources to science and 
technology; and 
--- To actively expand military 
and security cooperation, 
deepen military relations with 
major powers, neighboring 
countries and other developing 
countries, and promote the 
establishment of a regional 
framework for security and 
cooperation. 
2015C -In line with the strategic 
requirement of offshore waters 
defense and open seas 
protection, the PLA Navy 
(PLAN) will gradually shift its 
focus from “offshore waters 
defense” to the combination of 
“offshore waters defense” with 
“open seas protection,” and 
build a combined, multi-
functional and efficient marine 
combat force structure. The 
PLAN will enhance its 
capabilities for strategic 
deterrence and counterattack, 
maritime maneuvers, joint 
operations at sea, 
comprehensive defense and 
comprehensive support. 
China will bolster 
its navy to defend 
its maritime and 
developmental 
interests, in line 
with strategic 
deterrence 
guidelines. 
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-Force Development in Critical 
Security Domains 
-The seas and oceans bear on 
the enduring peace, lasting 
stability and sustainable 
development of China. The 
traditional mentality that land 
outweighs sea must be 
abandoned, and great 
importance has to be attached 
to managing the seas and 
oceans and protecting maritime 
rights and interests. It is 
necessary for China to develop 
a modern maritime military 
force structure commensurate 
with its national security and 
development interests, 
safeguard its national 
sovereignty and maritime 
rights and interests, protect the 
security of strategic SLOCs 
and overseas interests, and 
participate in international 
maritime cooperation, so as to 
provide strategic support for 
building itself into a maritime 
power. 
2015C -Outer space has become a 
commanding height in 
international strategic 
competition. Countries 
concerned are developing their 
space forces and instruments, 
and the first signs of 
weaponization of outer space 
have appeared. China has all 
Outer space is a 
new important 
domain for china, 
and the 
weaponization of 
space presents a 
threat to China. 
China attempts to 
cooperate in 
Outer space 
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along advocated the peaceful 
use of outer space, opposed the 
weaponization of and arms 
race in outer space, and taken 
an active part in international 
space cooperation. China will 
keep abreast of the dynamics of 
outer space, deal with security 
threats and challenges in that 
domain, and secure its space 
assets to serve its national 
economic and social 
development, and maintain 
outer space security. 
international efforts 
to keep space 
peaceful. 
International 
cooperation. 
2015C -Cyberspace has become a new 
pillar of economic and social 
development, and a new 
domain of national security. As 
international strategic 
competition in cyberspace has 
been turning increasingly 
fiercer, quite a few countries 
are developing their cyber 
military forces. Being one of 
the major victims of hacker 
attacks, China is confronted 
with grave security threats to 
its cyber infrastructure. As 
cyberspace weighs more in 
military security, China will 
expedite the development of a 
cyber force, and enhance its 
capabilities of cyberspace 
situation awareness, cyber 
defense, support for the 
country’s endeavors in 
cyberspace and participation in 
international cyber 
Cyberspace is a 
new important 
domain for holistic 
Chinese efforts. It 
presents a wide 
variety of threats to 
critical 
infrastructure and 
constituent parts to 
Chinese 
governmental 
security. 
Cyberspace 
 
Military Cyber 
 AoI: 
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cooperation, so as to stem 
major cyber crises, ensure 
national network and 
information security, and 
maintain national security and 
social stability. 
2015C -Pushing ahead with PMS in all 
directions and domains. Due to 
its complex geostrategic 
environment, China faces 
various threats and challenges 
in all its strategic directions 
and security domains. 
Therefore, PMS must be 
carried out in a well-planned, 
prioritized, comprehensive and 
coordinated way, so as to 
maintain the balance and 
stability of the overall strategic 
situation. China’s armed forces 
will make overall planning for 
PMS in both traditional and 
new security domains, and get 
ready to safeguard national 
sovereignty and security, 
protect the country’s maritime 
rights and interests, and deal 
with armed conflicts and 
emergencies. To adapt to the 
upgrading of weaponry and 
equipment as well as changes 
of operational patterns, China’s 
armed forces will further 
optimize battlefield disposition 
and strengthen strategic 
prepositioning. 
China has a wide 
variety of threats 
across many 
domains that must 
be addressed on a 
theoretical level; 
including its 
maritime rights and 
interests. 
Paradigm setting 
 
Maritime Rights and 
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2015C -Preparing for military 
operations other than war 
(MOOTWs). As a necessary 
requirement for China’s armed 
forces to fulfill their 
responsibilities and missions in 
the new period as well as an 
important approach to 
enhancing their operational 
capabilities, the armed forces 
will continue to conduct such 
MOOTWs as emergency 
rescue and disaster relief, 
counter-terrorism and stability 
maintenance, rights and 
interests protection, guard duty, 
international peacekeeping, and 
international humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief 
(HADR). They will work to 
incorporate MOOTW capacity 
building into military 
modernization and PMS, and 
pay special attention to 
establishing emergency 
command mechanisms, 
building emergency forces, 
training professionals, 
supporting task-specific 
equipment, and formulating 
relevant policies and 
regulations. Military 
emergency-response command 
systems will be tuned into state 
emergency management 
mechanisms. China’s armed 
forces will persist in unified 
organization and command, 
The military will 
be used in non-
military roles to 
increase their 
utility; including 
stability 
maintenance and 
other mechanisms 
for overseas 
interests. 
Overseas interests 
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scientific employment of 
forces, rapid and efficient 
actions, and strict observation 
of related policies and 
regulations. 
2015C -Pursuing a security concept 
featuring common, 
comprehensive, cooperative 
and sustainable security, 
China’s armed forces will 
continue to develop military-
to-military relations that are 
non-aligned, non-
confrontational and not 
directed against any third party. 
They will strive to establish 
fair and effective collective 
security mechanisms and 
military confidence-building 
measures (CBMs), expand 
military and security 
cooperation, and create a 
security environment favorable 
to China’s peaceful 
development. 
China desires non-
aligned, non-
confrontational, 
relations with other 
states for a 
peaceful and stable 
environment. It 
believes it can 
accomplish this 
through regional 
military 
cooperation.  
Non-alignment 
 
Non-confrontational 
 
Regional Cooperation 
Y Precept 
 
AoI: Regional 
Stability 
2015C -Developing all-round military-
to-military relations. China’s 
armed forces will further their 
exchanges and cooperation 
with the Russian military 
within the framework of the 
comprehensive strategic 
partnership of coordination 
between China and Russia, and 
foster a comprehensive, diverse 
and sustainable framework to 
promote military relations in 
China desires to 
have bilateral 
military relations, 
dialogue,  and 
exchanges with 
Russia and the US 
for regional 
stability. It also 
prioritizes relations 
with non-specified 
European, African, 
Latin American, 
Regional Stability 
 
International 
cooperation 
 
Military cooperation 
 
Dialogue 
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more fields and at more levels. 
China’s armed forces will 
continue to foster a new model 
of military relationship with 
the US armed forces that 
conforms to the new model of 
major-country relations 
between the two countries, 
strengthen defense dialogues, 
exchanges and cooperation, 
and improve the CBM 
mechanism for the notification 
of major military activities as 
well as the rules of behavior 
for safety of air and maritime 
encounters, so as to strengthen 
mutual trust, prevent risks and 
manage crises. In the spirit of 
neighborhood diplomacy of 
friendship, sincerity, 
reciprocity and inclusiveness, 
China’s armed forces will 
further develop relations with 
their counterparts in 
neighboring countries. Also, 
they will work to raise the level 
of military relations with 
European counterparts, 
continue the traditional friendly 
military ties with their African, 
Latin American and Southern 
Pacific counterparts. China’s 
armed forces will work to 
further defense and security 
cooperation in the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization 
(SCO), and continue to 
participate in multilateral 
and South Pacific 
counterparts.  It 
singles out the 
SCO, ASEAN 
organs, SLD, 
JIDD, and WPNS 
to further security 
cooperation. 
Conflict management 
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dialogues and cooperation 
mechanisms such as the 
ASEAN Defense Ministers’ 
Meeting Plus (ADMM+), 
ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF), Shangri-La Dialogue 
(SLD), Jakarta International 
Defence Dialogue (JIDD) and 
Western Pacific Naval 
Symposium (WPNS). The 
Chinese military will continue 
to host multilateral events like 
the Xiangshan Forum, striving 
to establish a new framework 
for security and cooperation 
conducive to peace, stability 
and prosperity in the Asia-
Pacific region. 
2015C -Pushing ahead with pragmatic 
military cooperation. On the 
basis of mutual respect, 
equality, mutual benefit and 
all-win cooperation, China’s 
armed forces will continue to 
carry out pragmatic 
cooperation with their 
counterparts in various 
countries of the world. In 
response to the changing 
situation, China’s armed forces 
will constantly explore new 
fields, new contents and new 
models of cooperation with 
other militaries, so as to jointly 
deal with a diverse range of 
security threats and challenges. 
Extensive dialogues and 
exchanges will be conducted 
China will continue 
cooperation with 
their counterparts 
for military 
cooperation and 
explore other 
methods of 
cooperation for 
regional, overseas, 
and maritime 
security. 
Military cooperation 
 
Regional Stability 
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Overseas interests 
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with foreign militaries on 
defense policy, services and 
arms building, institutional 
education, logistics and other 
subjects to promote mutual 
understanding, mutual trust and 
mutual learning. The Chinese 
military will also strengthen 
cooperation with related 
countries in personnel training, 
material assistance, equipment 
and technology, so as to 
strengthen mutual support and 
enhance respective defensive 
capabilities. Bilateral and 
multilateral joint exercises and 
training, involving various 
services and arms, will be 
conducted at multiple levels 
and in various domains to 
enhance joint operational 
capabilities. The Chinese 
military will work to extend the 
subjects of such training and 
exercises from non-traditional 
to traditional security areas. It 
will actively participate in 
international maritime security 
dialogues and cooperation, and 
jointly deal with traditional and 
non-traditional maritime 
security threats. 
2015C -Fulfilling international 
responsibilities and obligations. 
China’s armed forces will 
continue to participate in UN 
peacekeeping missions, strictly 
observe the mandates of the 
China views that it 
has international 
obligations in 
following the lead 
of the UN and 
UNSC, as well as 
International 
Obligations 
 
UN 
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UN Security Council, maintain 
its commitment to the peaceful 
settlement of conflicts, 
promote development and 
reconstruction, and safeguard 
regional peace and security. 
China’s armed forces will 
continue to take an active part 
in international disaster rescue 
and humanitarian assistance, 
dispatch professional rescue 
teams to disaster-stricken areas 
for relief and disaster 
reduction, provide relief 
materials and medical aid, and 
strengthen international 
exchanges in the fields of 
rescue and disaster reduction. 
Through the aforementioned 
operations, the armed forces 
can also enhance their own 
capabilities and expertise. 
Faithfully fulfilling China’s 
international obligations, the 
country’s armed forces will 
continue to carry out escort 
missions in the Gulf of Aden 
and other sea areas as required, 
enhance exchanges and 
cooperation with naval task 
forces of other countries, and 
jointly secure international 
SLOCs. China’s armed forces 
will engage in extensive 
regional and international 
security affairs, and promote 
the establishment of the 
mechanisms of emergency 
an obligation for 
conflict 
management, 
especially in 
regional peace. 
Humanitarian 
relief, maritime 
interests, regional 
security, among 
other specific 
peace-related 
responsibilities are 
counted among 
China’s 
obligations. 
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notification, military risk 
precaution, crisis management 
and conflict control. With the 
growth of national strength, 
China’s armed forces will 
gradually intensify their 
participation in such operations 
as international peacekeeping 
and humanitarian assistance, 
and do their utmost to shoulder 
more international 
responsibilities and obligations, 
provide more public security 
goods, and contribute more to 
world peace and common 
development. 
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- ‘2014R’: 2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 
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- ‘2015C’: 2015 China’s Military Strategy 
‘Meaningful Unit’: Full Text as per standard QCA. 
‘Condensed Meaningful Unit: Summarized texts as per standard QCA. 
‘Codes’: Differentiated coding as per standard QCA. 
‘Use’: ‘Usable’. Denotes the conditionality of a meaningful unit to be used as an 
indicator for deterrence. If the subject-object characterization is descriptive, rather than 
declaratory and relationship-defining; then it does not qualify to be used. Disqualifying 
factors are primarily measurement-based. [See: ‘Methodological Framework’ for 
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- ‘AoI’ : ‘Area of Interest’. The operationalized categorization frame for this 
thesis [See: ‘Methodological Framework’. 
- ‘Precept’: Denotes categorization of guiding principle to be compared later in 
the context of empirical state actions. 
- ‘Viewpoint’: Denotes categorization of framing of a particular paradigm to be 
compared later to contextualize state actions. 
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